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Abstract
In this article I expound an understanding of the quantum mechanics of so-called
“indistinguishable” systems in which permutation invariance is taken as a symmetry
of a special kind, namely the result of representational redundancy. This understand-
ing has heterodox consequences for the understanding of the states of constituent
systems in an assembly and for the notion of entanglement. It corrects widespread
misconceptions about the inter-theoretic relations between quantum mechanics and
both classical particle mechanics and quantum field theory.
The most striking of the heterodox consequences are: (i) that fermionic states
ought not always to be considered entangled; (ii) it is possible for two fermions or
two bosons to be discerned using purely monadic quantities; and that (iii) fermions
(but not bosons) may always be so discerned.
After an introduction to the key ideas of permutation invariance (Section 1),
I outline and reject in Section 2 a widespread interpretation of the quantum for-
malism associated with “indistinguishable” systems. In Section 3 I offer my own
alternative interpretation, in which quantum systems may be “qualitatively individ-
uated”, that is, individuated according to their states. This gives rise to a novel
(albeit elementary) technical machinery, which I extend in Section 4 to individual
systems considered in isolation. There I give a general prescription for calculating
the state of any individual “indistinguishable” system. In Section 5 I explore the
implications for the notion of entanglement and link up with some recent physics
literature on the matter. In Section 6 I explore the implications for the discernibility
of so-called “indistinguishable” systems—I will argue that such systems are in fact
usually discernible. I conclude in Section 7.
∗adam.caulton@gmail.com
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1 Introduction
What would it mean for a quantum mechanical theory to be permutation invariant?
By now the philosophy literature on permutation invariance and related issues in quan-
tum mechanics is formidable, and a variety of construals of permutation invariance have
been well articulated.1 The purpose of this article is to expound and advocate a con-
strual according to which permutation invariance is treated as what I have elsewhere
called an analytic symmetry. In analogy with analytic propositions, the truth of ana-
lytic symmetries—i.e. the holding of such symmetries—is a logical consequence of our
choice of representational system. One surely uncontroversial example is the gauge sym-
metry of electromagnetic theories, which is taken by (almost2) all to be constituted by a
representational redundancy—idle wheels, or “descriptive fluff” in the words of Earman
(2004)—in the mathematical formalism of the theory. My motivating idea here is that
permutation symmetry is constituted by a similar representational redundancy: quan-
tum mechanics is permutation invariant because what is permuted in the mathematical
formalism has no physical reality.
This doctrine, that permutation symmetry is due to representational redundancy,
may be familiar, but its unassailable consequences are much less so. A central nega-
tive claim of this paper (in section 2) will be that a great many formal and informal
discussions, in both the physics and philosophy of physics literature, tacitly rely on an
interpretative doctrine that is mistaken—even explicitly disavowed in those very same
discussions. And no surprise: the doctrine, like many aspects of linguistic practice, is
hard to expunge.
This interpretative doctrine—which I call factorism—treats the factor Hilbert spaces
of a joint Hilbert space, the latter of which represents the possible states of an assembly
of systems, as having separate physical significance, even when permutation invariance
has been imposed. This doctrine justifies, and is required to justify, a number of formal
procedures and technical definitions. There are two particularly important examples:
the partial tracing procedure for calculating the states of constituent systems and the
definition of entanglement as non-separability.
1. Partial tracing. Given any state—a density operator—of an assembly of systems,
the state of each constituent system is taken to be given by a reduced density
operator obtained by performing a partial trace over all factor Hilbert spaces except
the space taken to correspond to the system of interest (see e.g. Nielsen & Chuang
(2010, 105ff.)).
For the purposes of illustration, take for example the joint Hilbert space H :=
1A short reading list would have to include: Margenau (1944), French & Redhead (1988), Butterfield
(1993), Huggett (1999), Massimi (2001), Huggett (2003), Saunders (2003a, 2003b, 2006), French &
Krause (2006, ch. 4), Muller & Saunders (2008), Muller & Seevinck (2009), Huggett & Imbo (2009),
Caulton & Butterfield (2012b), Caulton (2013), Huggett and Norton (2013), Ladyman et al (2013).
2Belot (1998) and Healey (2007) have both entertained denying that electromagnetic U(1) gauge
symmetry is “analytic”, in the face of unpalatable consequences otherwise.
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H ⊗ H, and any density operator ρ ∈ D(H) in the class of unit-trace, positive
operators on H. The reduced state of each of the two constituent systems is then
supposed to be given by a partial trace of ρ over the other factor Hilbert space:
ρ1 = Tr2(ρ); ρ2 = Tr1(ρ) (1)
When permutation invariance is imposed, and the relevant joint Hilbert space
becomes either the symmetric or anti-symmetric subspace of H, this procedure
continues to be used to extract the states of the constituent systems.
But if permutation invariance is an analytic symmetry, then factor Hilbert space
labels represent nothing physical; so the prescriptions given in (1) cannot have
anything other than formal significance. (I will later argue that they both yield
the “average state” of the constituent systems, under an appropriately modified
understanding of what the constituent systems are, given in sections 3 and 4.)
If that is right, then we are in need of an alternative prescription, once permutation
invariance has been imposed. I will suggest an alternative below (section 4.2).
An important interpretative upshot is that the claim, commonly found in the
philosophy literature, that when permutation invariance is imposed, all constituent
systems occupy the same state (usually an improper mixture: always so in the case
of fermions), is false. In fact we will see (in section 6.2) that fermions are always
in different states, as per the informal and much maligned understanding of Pauli
exclusion, and that, in all but a minority of states, so are bosons.
The immediate consequence of this is that fermions obey a certain strong version of
Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, according to which fermions are
always discernible by monadic predicates alone, a.k.a. being absolutely discernible.3
As for bosons, we will see (in section 6.3) that they too are often discernible in
the same strong sense, but also that there may be utterly indiscernible—that is,
not even weakly discernible—despite recent claims to the contrary (Muller and
Seevinck (2009), Caulton (2013), Huggett and Norton (2013)).
2. Entanglement as non-separability. Entanglement for an assembly of systems is
almost exclusively defined formally as the non-separability of the assembly’s joint
state, i.e. the inability to write it as a product state in any single-system basis
(throughout I restrict to pure states of the assembly). If factorism is correct,
then this is indeed justified: for then it would be true to say that a non-separable
state represents a joint state of the assembly whose constituent systems do not
themselves possess definite (i.e. pure) states.
3Weyl (1928, 247) seems to have recognised this; he referred to the Pauli exclusion principle as the
‘Leibniz-Pauli principle’. Muller and Saunders (2008, 501) have claimed Weyl (1928) as an early advocate
for their own view, based on a principle of charity and the belief that their account is the only one that
makes fermions discernible in any non-trivial sense. But it is doubtful that their subtle notion of weak
discernibility is what Weyl had in mind; I contend that it is more plausible that Weyl took fermions to
be discernible in the stronger sense defended here.
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But a consequence of the physical emptiness of the factor Hilbert space labels is
that we cannot read facts about a physical state so readily off the mathematical
form of the state-vector used to represent it. Instead we need to look at the algebra
of admissible operators, which is greatly restricted under permutation invariance.4
There we find that the sort of entanglement that arises when this restricted algebra
operates is much harder to achieve than non-separability: that is, non-separability
does not entail entanglement.
I said that entanglement is almost exclusively defined as non-separability. In fact
there are dissenters, chiefly Ghirardi, Marinatto & Weber (2002) (see also Ghirardi
& Marinatto (2003, 2004, 2005)) (and inspired by them, Ladyman et al (2013)),
Schliemann et al (2001) and Eckert et al (2002), all of whom are motivated by
considerations that have also inspired this paper. As I will argue below (in section
5) the notion of entanglement that is most appropriate under permutation invari-
ance agrees with the notions suggested by these authors when they agree with
each other. And I use considerations from the restricted joint algebra to arbitrate
between them when they disagree. A consequence of these considerations will be
that fermions are not always entangled, inextricably and over cosmic distances,
despite commonplace claims to the contrary.
At this point, some readers may be feeling somewhat sceptical about the current
project. Interpretative philosophy of physics may seem like a recherche´ enterprise
at the best of times. But in this case, you may be asking yourself, must more ink
be spilt trying to interpret a theoretical framework—elementary many-system quan-
tum mechanics—when we already have a better theory—namely, quantum field theory
(henceforth, QFT)—to which to apply our best efforts? In the state space of quantum
field theory, permutation invariance is imposed at the outset, so surely there is no danger
of being led astray by a redundant formalism. Why worry about elementary quantum
mechanics?
I have two broad answers to this (I concede that they will not satisfy everyone). The
first is that, despite having been superseded, elementary quantum mechanics continues
to be invaluable in solving a variety of physical problems—particularly in quantum
optics and quantum information theory. Good conceptual housekeeping here would mean
that we could be confident in physical interpretations without having first to translate
everything into the language of Fock space and creation and annihilation operators.
(However, such a translation can be illuminating! I offer one in section 4.3.) And, as
I will argue in section 2.3, without something like the interpretation I offer here of the
quantum formalism, the relation of elementary quantum mechanics to both its successor,
QFT, and its predecessor, classical particle mechanics, is at best obscure and at worst
paradoxical.
Secondly, a better understanding of the framework of many-system elementary quan-
tum mechanics actually aids our understanding of the framework of QFT. Not only will
4I am indebted to John Earman for this insight.
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I advocate an interpretation of the quantum formalism that meshes better (than the
current orthodoxy) with QFT in the limit of conserved total particle number. Also,
I will argue that the metaphysical conclusions drawn here about elementary quantum
mechanics may be exported to QFT.
I re-iterate that this is predominantly a project of interpretation; my goal is a bet-
ter understanding of an old theory rather than the generation of new technical results.
But interpretation and formal results cannot be sharply separated: interpretation in-
spires and gives significance to formal results, and formal results offer precision in the
articulation of interpretations. Thus the novel results in this paper include:
1. the articulation of a new method for extracting the states of constituent systems
from the state of their assembly (section 4);
2. the definition of an alternative notion of entanglement for bosons and fermions,
accompanied by a continuous measure of it (section 5); and
3. a proof of the fermionic counterpart to Gisin’s Theorem (1991), appropriate for
this new notion of entanglement (section 5.2)
I should also mention—although it will already be clear—that my general interpre-
tative approach is a ‘realist’ or ‘representationalist’ one. That is, I work under the
assumption that the quantum formalism represents, or at least aims at representing,
more or less straightforwardly, underlying physical objects and processes. This sets
me apart from those who advocate a ‘pragmatic’ interpretation of quantum mechanics
(such as Healey (2012)), those who advocate a subjective or Bayesian interpretation (e.g.
Fuchs (2002)), and those who advocate not attempting an interpretation at all.
Within the representationalist camp, I also set myself apart from those who deem
the quantum formalism to be ‘incomplete’, at least at the microscopic scale; that is, I
will not consider any of the various hidden variable solutions, such as the de Broglie-
Bohm (“pilot wave”) approach. That said, my considerations can be taken as limited
to the microscopic realm, so I will not need to address the measurement problem. The
upshot is that the metaphysical claims in this article ought to be acceptable to those who
advocate either dynamical collapse, modal, or Everettian (“many world”) approaches.
1.1 Preliminaries: permutation invariance
I will here briefly outline the technicalities that will be in use throughout this paper. One
of the most important mathematical objects will be the single-system Hilbert space, H,
and its associated algebra of bounded operators, B(H). H may be any separable Hilbert
space. In the taxonomy of Murray and von Neumann (1936), B(H) and any other algebra
encountered in this paper will be of type I. (This will be helpful in section 3.2, where
the commutativity of two single-system algebras will be taken to entail a tensor product
structure.)
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From the single-system Hilbert space H we construct the prima facie joint Hilbert
space for N equivalent systems by forming a tensor product:
H(N) := H⊗H⊗ . . .⊗H︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
≡
N⊗
H (2)
(Fraktur typeface will always be used to denote many-system Hilbert spaces). The
equivalence of our constituent systems is expressed by the fact that each factor Hilbert
space in (2) is a copy of the same single-system Hilbert space. Amongst other things,
this equivalence means that it makes sense to speak of two constituent systems sharing
the same state, so that we may talk e.g. of multiple occupation of the same single-system
state.
Clearly, the equivalence of two constituent systems in this sense entails that their
respective single-system Hilbert spaces, equipped with their operator algebras, are uni-
tarily equivalent. So if these Hilbert spaces support irreducible representations of some
group of spacetime symmetries (e.g. the Galilei or Poincare´ group), then the systems
must possess the same “intrinsic”, or state-independent, properties, such as rest mass
and intrinsic spin.
The joint Hilbert space H(N) supports a unitary representation P : SN → B(H(N))
of SN , the group of all permutations of N symbols (for more details, see e.g. Greiner &
Mu¨ller (1994, ch. 9) or Tung (1985, ch. 5)). Let {|k〉}, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d := dim(H)} be an
orthonormal basis for the single-system Hilbert space H. Then P is defined by its action
on product states of H(N). Let k : {1, 2, . . . N} → {1, 2, . . . d}, then for all pi ∈ SN ,
P (pi)|k(1)〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |k(N)〉 := |(k ◦ pi−1)(1)〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |(k ◦ pi−1)(N)〉 (3)
The definition of P is completed by extending by linearity to the whole of H(N).
Permutation invariance (henceforth, PI; also known as the Indistinguishability Pos-
tulate, e.g. in French & Krause (2006, 131ff.)) is then an SN -equivariance condition on
the joint algebra B(H(N)). That is, for all pi ∈ SN and all |ψ〉 ∈ H(N),
〈ψ|P †(pi)QP (pi)|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|Q|ψ〉 (4)
In more physical language: PI requires that expectation values for all physical operators
(operators that have a physical interpretation) be invariant under permutations of the
factor Hilbert spaces. The restriction of the joint algebra from B(H(N)) to the algebra of
operators that satisfy this condition—i.e., the SN -equivariant, or symmetric operators—
constitutes a superselection rule. The superselection sectors are parameterized by the ir-
reducible representations ∆µ (‘irreps’) of SN , two of which are one-dimensional: namely,
the trivial representation ∆+(pi) = 1, which corresponds to bosons, and the alternating
representation ∆−(pi) = (−1)#(pi) (where #(pi) is the number of inversions in the per-
mutation pi), which corresponds to fermions. Let us label the boson sector of H(N) H
(N)
+
and the fermion sector H
(N)
− . (If N > 3, then there are also multi-dimensional irreps,
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corresponding to various types of paraparticle; so H
(N)
+ ⊕H(N)− @ H(N), where ‘@’ denotes
proper subspacehood. Paraparticles will not be considered for the rest of this paper.)
A note about terminology: I will talk about assemblies of “indistinguishable” systems
whenever PI is imposed (I use scare quotes, because my main contention is of course that
the systems are distinguishable!) and talk about “distinguishable” systems whenever PI
is imposed—even if the systems are equivalent in the sense above, namely that they are
individually represented by copies of the same Hilbert space.
Let me say a few words on the justification of permutation invariance. The only
real justification can be that it leads to empirical adequacy, and that it does is not in
question.5 Alternative justifications of an a priori character are sometimes seen in the
literature. One runs along the lines that, since the constituent systems of the assembly
possess all the same “intrinsic” properties, one would not expect the expectation value of
any beable to change upon a permutation of those systems.6 This justification is suspect
for at least two reasons. First, it presumes a representational connection between the
mathematical formalism and the physics which it is my main interest here to deny;
namely that factor Hilbert space labels represent or denote particles (for it is the factor
Hilbert space labels that are being permuted in PI).
Second, even granted this representational connection, the inference from identical
“intrinsic” properties to permutation-invariant expectation values for all beables is in-
valid. At first blush, nothing seems particularly suspect about the beable, ‘location of
system 17’ (represented by the operator
⊗16
1⊗Q⊗⊗N−17 1, where Q is the single-
system position operator), and one would certainly not expect this beable to preserve
its expectation value upon a change of the label ‘17’ to, say, ‘5’, since then one would be
talking about the location of system 5, and there is no reason to think that, just because
systems 5 and 17 share the same “intrinsic” properties, it follows that they must share
the same location.7
It would be a mistake to reply to this that PI does nothing but express the truism that
we could have labelled system 17 e.g. with the numeral ‘5’ instead.8 PI cannot express
that truism, first of all because it entails non-trivial empirical predictions, such as the
5Cf. e.g. Prugovecˇki (1981, 307): ‘It has been observed that the assumption that the state Ψ of the
system (e.g., gas) S in which particle Sk is in the state Ψk and particle Sl in the state Ψl is identical to
the state of S in which Sk is in the state Ψl and Sl in the state Ψk leads to a correct energy distribution
in the case of particles of integer spin.’
6Messiah & Greenberg (1964, B250), the locus classicus for permutation invariance in quantum
mechanics, write, ‘Any one of these permutations [pi ∈ SN ] is a mere reshuffling of the labels attached to
the particles belonging to the same species. Since these particles are identical, it must not lead to any
observable effects.’ Similar claims are made in the textbooks, e.g. Rae (1992, 205): ‘Identical particles
are often referred to as indistinguishable in order to emphasize the fact that they cannot be distinguished
by any physical measurement. This implies that an operator representing any physical measurement on
the system must remain unchanged if the labels assigned to the individual particles are interchanged.’
7Huggett and Imbo (2009) give an excellent critique of this fallacious reasoning.
8E.g. Merzbacher (1997, 535): ‘Since the order in which the particles are labeled has, by the definition
of particle identity, no physical significance, state vectors (or wavefunctions) that differ only in the
permutation of the labels must define the same state.’
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divergence of assemblies in thermal states from classical Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics—
how could such a non-trivial, contingent fact be explained by the truism that we could
have chosen a different notational convention from the one that we in fact use? And
secondly, PI does not express that truism because it is reflected instead in the possibility
that, for any state-vector |ψ〉 in H(N), we could instead have used P (5, 17)|ψ〉 to represent
the same physical state that we currently use |ψ〉 to represent. And all that this requires
is that the two algebras associated with each labelling convention be unitarily equivalent.
But that is trivial, since P (5, 17)B(H(N))P †(5, 17) (where (5, 17) is the permutation that
swaps symbols 5 and 17) and B(H(N)) are not only unitarily equivalent, they are identical.
There is another justification for PI that is more credible. This justification is that
factor Hilbert space labels (i.e. the order in which the factor Hilbert spaces lie in the
tensor product) represent nothing at all. If they represented nothing at all, then we
certainly would expect—indeed, we would have to ensure—that beables’ expectation
values were invariant under their permutation. Otherwise a permutation would represent
a physical difference, and that would contradict the original claim that the things being
permuted represented nothing.
In fact the only problem with this justification is that, for it to be useful as a
justification, we need already to have come to the conclusion that factor Hilbert space
labels represent nothing. How do we come to that conclusion? Well, the representational
connections between our mathematical formalism and the physical world are a matter of
our choosing, but on that choice depends the experimental predictions one draws from
the theory, i.e. what we take our theory to be saying. (It might even be better to say that
theories are distinguished not only by their formalisms but also by the representational
connections that we determine for them.) And PI, or at least its consequences for the
collective behaviour of particles, is an example of those predictions. So to justify PI
in this way, we already need to know that it is obeyed—but that is just our original
justification: empirical adequacy.
While this means that we cannot take our doctrine about Hilbert space labels to
justify PI, perhaps we can reverse the situation by instead taking the empirical success
of PI as abductive support for that doctrine. This would require the absence of anything
physical, to which the factor Hilbert space labels would otherwise correspond, to be the
best explanation for PI. Is that the best explanation of PI? I see no reason to think that
the case here is any worse than the analogous case in electromagnetism, in which gauge
invariance is best explained by the physical unreality of the four-vector potential field.
Other reasons, if not to support the doctrine that factor Hilbert space labels represent
nothing, then at least to renounce the doctrine that factor Hilbert space labels represent
or denote the constituent systems of the assembly, are given in sections 2.3 and 2.4. But
first I will say a little more about that doctrine.
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2 Against factorism
This section is dedicated to dispensing with the doctrine I call factorism. In section
2.1, I give a precise definition of this doctrine. In section 2.2, I contrast factorism with
haecceitism, a more familiar interpretative doctrine in the quantum philosophy litera-
ture. My criticisms of factorism comprise two sections: section 2.3 discusses the trouble
factorism causes for the inter-theoretic relation between quantum mechanics and both
classical particle mechanics and QFT; and section 2.4 argues that factorism contravenes
the principle that unitary equivalent representation represent the same physical possi-
bilities.
2.1 Factorism defined
Factorism says: particles are the physical correlates of the labels of factor Hilbert spaces.
This view is orthodox: indeed, not just orthodox, but well-nigh universal.9 It is deeply
entrenched in the way we all speak and think, and learn, about quantum mechanics for
more than one system. To explain this, and how the view is nonetheless deniable, it will
be clearest to begin by considering first, an assembly of equivalent but “distinguishable”
systems (in the sense of section 1.1). Here the relevant joint Hilbert space is H(N).
Each factor Hilbert space H in the expression (2) for H(N) represents the space of
pure states for each system. The full space of states—including the mixed states—for
each particle is then represented by D(H), the space of density operators defined on H.
Factorism now takes the position that the ith copy of H (D(H)) represents the possible
pure (mixed) states for the ith system, so that each Hilbert space label—i.e. its position
in the tensor product in (2)—may be taken to represent or denote its corresponding
system.
I concur. I am happy to take this step: I agree that “distinguishable” systems are
the physical correlates of the labels of factor Hilbert spaces, in the usual tensor-product
formalism.
But factorism goes beyond this agreement. It says that the same goes for “indistin-
guishable” systems: i.e. that the labels of the factor Hilbert spaces represent or denote
their corresponding systems. Or in other words: although under PI such an assembly is
described by the symmetric (H
(N)
+ ) or antisymmetric (H
(N)
− ) subspace of the tensor prod-
uct space H(N), this does not disrupt the factor spaces’ labels referring to the constituent
systems. Thus when one treats an assembly using the symmetric or antisymmetric sub-
space of (H(N)), factorism says that there are N constituent systems, one for each factor
space, and the ith system’s pure (mixed) states are represented by the state-vectors in
the ith copy of H (density operators in the ith copy of D(H)).
9It is a key interpretative assumption in all of the articles mentioned in footnote 1, except for Ladyman
et al (2013).
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2.2 Factorism and haecceitism
Some readers may be wondering how the doctrine I have called factorism differs from
haecceitism, an interpretative doctrine which is more familiar in the philosophy of quan-
tum theory (and logic and metaphysics quite generally). In fact they are quite different—
indeed they are logically independent, as I shall argue below.
Haecceitism and its denial, anti-haecceitism, are instances of a general issue to do
with the representation of possibilities. In philosophers’ jargon, the issue is whether
a distinction is real, as against ‘merely verbal’, ‘spurious’ or a ‘distinction without a
difference’. In the context of mathematical physics and its interpretation, the issue comes
down to whether there are redundancies in the representation of physical possibilities by
the mathematical objects in our theory’s formalism. That is, whether the representation
relation between mathematical states (vectors or rays of the Hilbert space) and physical
states is one-to-one or many-to-one.
The specific distinction with which haecceitism is associated concerns, like factorism,
the action of permutations on states. There may be some mathematical states ρ (which
in our case are the rays or minimal projectors of the joint Hilbert space) that are wholly
symmetric in the sense that their orbit under this action is a singleton set, i.e. contains
only the state in question: SN (ρ) = {ρ}. But typically a generic state ρ will have a
non-singleton orbit. So the question arises whether all the elements of the orbit SN (ρ)
represent the same physical state of affairs.
Anti-haecceitism may be defined as always answering ‘Yes’ to this question (cf. Lewis
(1986, 221)). This answer implements the intuitive idea of treating the underlying indi-
viduality of each system, the ‘which-is-which-ness’ of the systems, as physically empty or
unreal. Haecceitism therefore says, on the contrary, that distinct mathematical states in
an orbit represent distinct physical states. Intuitively, this implements the idea that the
underlying individuality of the systems is real. However, strictly speaking if haecceitism
is just the denial of anti-haecceitism, then it need not be committed to such specific
claims; it need only deny the rather global claim that permuted mathematical states
always correspond to the same physical state.
Haecceitism, in the sense just defined, is general enough to be assessed in classical or
in quantum mechanics. Finite-dimensional classical mechanics (e.g. of N point particles)
is, so far as I know, almost always formulated haecceitistically, i.e. so as to distinguish
states differing by a permutation of indistinguishable particles (although Belot (2001,
pp. 56-61) considers the anti-haecceitistic alternative). And in infinite-dimensional clas-
sical mechanics (i.e., the mechanics of continuous media—fluids or solids), one must be
a haecceitist (Butterfield (2011, pp. 358-61)).
In quantum mechanics under PI, the assessment of haecceitism is trivialized by the
fact that every state of H
(N)
+ and H
(N)
− is fixed by all permutations, i.e. P (pi)|ψ〉〈ψ|P †(pi) =
|ψ〉〈ψ|, so we never get an orbit of permuted states larger than a singleton set. (See Poo-
ley (2006). The situation changes when we consider paraparticles; see Caulton and But-
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terfield (2012b)). This already shows that factorism and haecceitism are not the same
doctrine; for while the issue of haecceitism vs. its denial cannot even be articulated for
“indistinguishable” systems, the issue of factorism vs. its denial can be articulated—and
answered.
At this point I must raise a problem with the definition of ‘haecceitism’ that I just
gave. Consider: if the precise definition of haecceitism in terms of system permutations
is to be true to the metaphysical spirit of haecceitism, we must assume that the system
labels must represent the objects whose which-is-which-ness the haecceitist wants to
defend as real. But that assumption is just factorism. Even the standard understanding
of haecceitism in quantum mechanics presumes factorism!
But a more noncommittal definition of ‘haecceitism’ is easy to formulate. We retain
the emphasis on system permutations, but refrain from assuming that system permuta-
tions are represented by permutations of the factor Hilbert space. That is, we refrain
from interpreting the unitary representation P of SN as permuting constituent systems.
(We do not give an alternative interpretation; we simply refrain from giving any inter-
pretation.)
We therefore have two formulations of haecceitism: a general formulation, which talks
of generating physical differences by a permutation of whatever represents or denotes
the constituent systems, and a specific formulation, which talks of generating physical
differences by a permutation of factor Hilbert spaces. Only if factorism is true are these
two formulations equivalent.
We just saw that if factorism is right (and we ignore paraparticles), then the question
of haecceitism cannot be settled. If, as I believe, factorism is wrong, then the specific for-
mulation (now stripped of its standard metaphysical interpretation) remains irresolvable.
There are then two remaining possibilities for the truth-value of the general formulation
of haecceitism. Both are consistent, but anti-haecceitism seems to be favoured. This is
because, in each of the joint Hilbert spaces H
(N)
+ and H
(N)
− , states identified by specifying
occupation numbers for single-system states appear at most once. It follows that the
mathematical structure required to even define a permutation of systems does not exist.
Thus haecceitism (in the broad sense) could be maintained by an anti-factorist only if
she is prepared to declare the standard mathematical formalism incomplete: a coherent
move, but a dubious one.
In summary, factorism is a proposal about how the constituent systems of an assembly
are represented in the formalism; while haecceitism, in its broad formulation, is a doctrine
about how the individuality or ‘which-is-which-ness’ of those systems contributes to the
individuation of joint states. Neither entails the other, but if factorism is wrong, then it
is best also to consider haecceitism false.
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2.3 Problems with inter-theoretic relations
Now I will turn to the first of my two criticisms of factorism, which is that it causes
trouble both for obtaining a classical limit and for viewing elementary quantum mechan-
ics as a limit of quantum field theory, when total particle number is conserved. This
criticism relies on an inescapable consequence of permutation invariance and factorism:
namely, that all constituent systems in an assembly possess the same state.
This can also be expressed in terms of the reduced density operators of the constituent
systems. According to the usual procedure of yielding the reduced density operator
of a particle by tracing out the states for all the other particles in the assembly (see
e.g. Nielsen & Chuang (2010, 105)), we obtain the result that for all (anti-) symmetrized
joint states, one obtains equal reduced density operators for every system.10 Moreover,
unless the joint state is bosonic, and a product of identical factors (e.g. |φ〉⊗|φ〉⊗. . .⊗|φ〉),
then the reduced state of every system will be statistically mixed.
One consequence of the ensuing “non-individuality” of factorist systems is that they
cannot become classical particles in an appropriate limit. This phenomenon is well
discussed by Dieks and Lubberdink (2011), but to summarise: In the classical limit,
factorist systems do not even approximately acquire the trajectories we associate with
classical particles, since the former must remain in statistically mixed states all the way
to the classical limit, or else possibly (if they are bosons) all remain in the same pure
state. Factorist systems cannot tend, in any limit, to become distinguished one from
another in space—like classical particles—by zero or at least negligible overlap, since
each factorist system always possesses the “entire spatial profile” of the assembly.
A similar point can be made about quantum field theory: factorist particles do not
tend to the behaviour of QFT-quanta if we consider the limit in which the total particle
number in conserved. This is because QFT-quanta—which are associated with creation
and annihiliation operators a†(φ), a(φ), for some state φ in the single-particle Hilbert
space H—always occupy pure states. Indeed: it may be shown (though I will not here)
that QFT-quanta behave just like classical particles in an appropriate classical limit for
QFT. Thus the factorist systems emerge as the embarrassing odd ones out. Something
has gone wrong.
2.4 Problems with unitary equivalence
My second criticism of factorism is that it defies an interpretative principle that ought
to be compulsory; namely that the unitary equivalence of two Hilbert spaces and ac-
companying algebras is a sufficient condition for considering those Hilbert spaces to be
equally good mathematical representations of the same space of physical possibilities.
10A selected bibliography for this result runs as follows: Margenau (1944), French & Redhead (1988),
Butterfield (1993), Huggett (1999, 2003), Massimi (2001), French & Krause (2006, pp. 150-73). All
these authors interpret this result as showing that Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is
pandemically false in quantum theory.
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Here we run into a potentially confusing ambiguity, which is an occupational hazard
of doing interpretative philosophy of physics: the philosophical term ‘representation’, in
the sense of a mathematical formalism representing physical facts, must be distinguished
from the technical term ‘representation’, in the sense of a map from an abstract algebra to
a concrete algebra of operators defined on some Hilbert space. To resolve this ambiguity,
I will use the term ‘rep’ for the technical concept, and continue to use ‘representation’
for the philosophical one.
More specifically, let us define a rep of a ∗-algebra A as an ordered pair 〈H, pi〉 of
a Hilbert space H and a ∗-homomorphism pi : A → B(H). Then two reps 〈H, pi〉 and
〈K, φ〉 are unitarily equivalent iff there is a unitary operator U : H → K such that
Upi[A] = φ[A]U (i.e. there is an intertwiner U between pi[A] and φ[A]).
I emphasise that the unitary equivalence of two Hilbert spaces is a much stronger
condition than their being isomorphic (which requires only that the have the same di-
mension). Unitary equivalence means that the same abstract algebra of operators is
being realised by the concrete algebras of two Hilbert spaces in such a way that pre-
serves all expectation values. It seems uncontroversial, then, that we should consider
any two unitarily equivalent reps to represent the same space of physical states, and
furthermore we should consider the intertwiner U to preserve physical interpretations.
However, there is a wrinkle here: not every physically relevant quantity may be
represented by the abstract algebra. If mathematical artefacts of one rep but not another
are also doing representational work, then we have a reason to block the inference from
unitary equivalence by the intertwiner U to preserved physical interpretation under
action by U .
For example, consider the joint Hilbert space H(2) := H⊗H, and suppose that the two
systems they describe are distinguished one from the other by at least one “intrinsic”
or state-independent property F (perhaps a haecceity) that one of the systems—but
not the other—possesses. Suppose that it is the first copy of H in the tensor product
that represents the system with F . How could F be represented in the mathematical
formalism? Certainly not by any non-trivial operator on H, since the property is state-
independent. But not by a trivial operator—some multiple of the identity, λ1, where
λ ∈ C—on H either, since both systems are represented by that Hilbert space, and it
would yield the same value both times. Similar considerations lead to the conclusion
that there is no way to represent F on H(2) either.
The only solution is to treat one of the factor Hilbert spaces as distinguished, as it
were “outside” the formalism. But the honour of being distinguished in this way will
not be preserved under unitary equivalence. For example, select some subspace S1 of
the first copy of H (the copy that represents the system with F ) and some subspace S2
of the second copy. Then the joint Hilbert space Hs := S1 ⊗S2 represents a subspace of
the joint Hilbert space H(2). But Hs, with its associated algebra, is unitarily equivalent
to Hp := S2 ⊗ S1 (‘p’ for ‘permute’) and its associated algebra: the intertwiner is the
permutation operator P (12) restricted to Hs. And while it is true that Hp would represent
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equally well the physical states currently represented by Hs, it is not true that P (12)
preserves the physical interpretation of the states between Hs and Hp. For example, the
state |Ψ〉 := |φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉 represents the physical state in which the system with F is in
the state (represented by) |φ〉 and the system without F is in the state (represented by)
|χ〉. But the permuted state P (12)|Ψ〉 instead represents the physical state in which
the system with F is in the state (represented by) |χ〉 and the system without F is
in the state (represented by) |φ〉. In summary, so long as there are deemed to be any
physical quantities not represented in the relevant algebras, we cannot allow that the
intertwiner between two unitary equivalent reps preserves the physical interpretation of
the components of those two reps.
The remedy for this wrinkle is simply to add a invariance condition to our interpre-
tative principle:
If two reps are unitarily equivalent, and any physical quantity not represented
in either algebra is invariant between them, then the intertwiner between the
two reps preserves the physical interpretation of any component of those two
reps.
This deals with the problem above, since the identity of the system that possesses F is
not invariant between Hs and Hp.
Factorism runs afoul of this interpretative principle. For, as the results of the next
section (3.2) show, there are subspaces of the symmetric and anti-symmetric spaces H
(N)
+
and H
(N)
− that are unitarily equivalent to subspaces of H(N). And so long as we take the
order of the factor Hilbert spaces to have no physical significance (for this is not invariant
between the subspaces), we ought, by the principle above, to give the same physical
interpretation to these subspaces. But that requires denying the result mentioned above
in section 2.3 that, under permutation invariance, all constituent systems are in the same
physical state. And the only way to resist that result is to relinquish the interpretative
doctrine that justifies taking the partial trace of a joint state to obtain the reduced state
of its constituents, which is factorism.
3 Qualitative individuation
This section inaugurates the positive part of this paper. The foregoing criticisms of
factorism have left us in need of an alternative procedure for extracting the states of
constituent systems from the joint state of an assembly. What we need is some way
to decompose the joint Hilbert space (H
(N)
+ or H
(N)
− ) in a way that obeys the strictest
interpretation of permutation invariance.
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3.1 Decomposing the right joint Hilbert space
One might say that factorism fails by trying to decompose the wrong joint Hilbert space.
Rather than decomposing H
(N)
+ or H
(N)
− into single-system Hilbert spaces, it instead
forgets the superselection rule induced by permutation invariance, embeds H(N)+ and
H
(N)
− back into H(N), and proceeds to decompose that instead. And the decomposition
of this space is easy, since by construction it has a tensor product structure. However,
what we want to do is take the superselection rule seriously, and try to decompose H
(N)
+
or H
(N)
− .
A natural idea is to try to find a similar N -fold tensor product structure in H
(N)
+
or H
(N)
− . In more detail, this would entail finding N putatively single-system Hilbert
spaces h1, h2, . . . hN , with associated single-system algebras, such that the tensor product
Hilbert space formed from these, h1⊗h2⊗ . . .⊗hN , is unitarily equivalent to one of H(N)+
or H
(N)
− .
But we face an immediate problem: these joint spaces may well have a prime number
of dimensions,11 which entails that only one of the would-be factor Hilbert spaces hk
could have more than 1 dimension! Worse: it is hard to see what physical interpretation,
in terms of single-system states, one could give to the multi-dimensional factor space hk.
However, this doomed idea can be rehabilitated: for we need not be so ambitious
so as to decompose the whole of the joint Hilbert space in one go. Instead, we can try
decomposing subspaces of H
(N)
+ or H
(N)
− .
Suppose such a decomposition successful in princple for some subspace S. Then
the collection of constituents corresponding to the decomposition must be interpreted as
co-existing only in those states belonging to S. This is not objectionable per se. Agreed:
in the case of “distinguishable systems” there are means of individuating systems which
will suffice for all states. But if one is not a haecceitist, why should one demand or
expect this all the time?
If there are two subspaces, S1 and S2 say, each of which may be decomposed, then
the question arises whether any constituent system represented in S1 is the same as any
constituent system represented in S2. It will turn out that this question does not have
an unequivocal answer. The associated metaphysical picture is one in which relations
of “trans-state identity” (as we might call it) have no objective significance, a quantum
analogue of Lewis’s (1968) celebrated Counterpart Theory. We should not be surprised:
as we saw in section 2.2, the anti-factorist picture, like Lewis’s, eschews haecceitism.
Now that we have limited our search for decompositions to subspaces of the joint
Hilbert space, it remains to be shown that such subspaces exist. It is the purpose of the
next section to prove that they do.
11For example, if H ∼= C2, then H(2)+ ∼= C3.
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3.2 Natural decompositions
I will use the term individuation for the act of picking out a object, or collection of
objects, according to some property that it may have; and I will call the property in
question the individuation criterion. Since individuation in this sense need not entail
uniqueness, an individuation criterion is not quite a Russellian definite description.
I will also say that an object, or class of objects, is qualitatively individuated iff its
individuation criterion is a qualitative property. I will assume that qualitative prop-
erties are represented by projectors in the single-system Hilbert space H. (Factorist
individuation—i.e. individuation according to factor Hilbert space labels—may be con-
sidered non-qualitative individuation.) These projectors need not be minimal, i.e. 1-
dimensional. But a minimal projector corresponds to a maximally logically strong qual-
itative property (something like a Leibnizian ‘individual concept’).
Since I deny factorism, in the context of PI qualitative individuation is our only means
of picking out constituent systems. I will argue here that the decomposable subspaces
of the joint Hilbert space may correspond to physical states in which the constituent
systems have been qualitatively individuated.
What counts as a successful decomposition of a joint Hilbert space? What are our
criteria for success? Here I draw upon the work of Zanardi (2001) and Zanardi et al
(2004), which emphasises working in terms of algebras of beables. Zanardi (2001, p. 3)
writes:
When is it legitimate to consider a pair of observable algebras as describing
a bipartite quantum system? Suppose that A1 and A2 are two commuting ∗-
subalgebras of A := End(H) such that the subalgebra A1∨A2 they generate,
i.e., the minimal ∗-subalgebra containing both A1 and A2, amounts to the
whole A, and moreover one has the (noncanonical) algebra isomorphism,
A1 ∨ A2 ∼= A1 ⊗A2 (5)
The standard, genuinely bipartite, situation is of course H = H1 ⊗H2,A1 =
End(H1) ⊗ 1, and A2 = 1 ⊗ End(H2). If A′i := {X | [X,A1] = 0} denotes
the commutant of A1, in this case one has A′i = A2.
Thus Zanardi’s proposal is to work by analogy with the case of distinguishable sys-
tems: we look for commuting subalgebras whose tensor product is isomorphic to the
joint (symmetric) algebra for the assembly’s Hilbert space. The ‘(noncanonical) algebra
isomorphism’ can for us be unitary equivalence.
Zanardi et al (2004, p. 1) offer three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for
what they coin a natural decomposition. I will express these by setting N = 2, for
definiteness (so that we are seeking a decomposition into two constituent systems).
• Local accessibility. This condition states that the subalgebras be ‘controllable’,
i.e. experimentally implementable. We have no need of this condition here, since
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our interest is not experimental but metaphysical. But we may replace it with the
condition that the subalgebras have a natural physical interpretation as single-
system algebras. This means that the beables in these algebras ought to have a
recognizable form as monadic quantities, such as position, momentum and spin.
• Subsystem independence. This condition requires the subalgebras to commute:
∀A ∈ A1,∀B ∈ A2 : [A,B] = 0. (6)
I.e., each system ought to possesses its properties independently of the other. This
condition will be familiar from algebraic quantum field theory, where it is imposed
on observable algebras associated with space-like separated, compact spacetime
regions under the name microcausality, and interpreted as vetoing the possibility
of act-outcome correlations between space-like separated events. (For more details,
see Halvorson (2007, sections 2.1, 7.2).)
• Completeness. This condition requires the minimum algebra containing both sub-
algebras to amount to the original joint algebra A:
A = A1 ∨ A2 (7)
This expresses the fact that the assembly in question has been decomposed without
residue.
We are here dealing only with separable Hilbert spaces, and therefore, in the tax-
onomy of Murray and von Neumann (1936), with type I algebras; it follows that the
second two conditions entail the tensor product structure expressed above in (5). And
we read the isomorphism ‘∼=’ as a claim of unitary equivalence. Thus we can say our
joint Hilbert space and its associated algebra has been naturally decomposed iff it is
unitarily equivalent to the tensor product of identifiably single-system Hilbert spaces
and their associated algebras.
3.3 Individuation blocks
I will now show that qualitatively individuated systems provide the natural decomposi-
tions being sought.
Let us consider what algebra of operators we may associate with a single, qualitatively
individuated system (for simplicity I will concentrate on the two-system case). Recall
that qualitative individuation is individuation by projectors. So suppose that our two
individuation criteria (one for each of the two systems) are given by the projectors
Eα, Eβ, each of which acts on the single-system Hilbert space H.
It is important that Eα ⊥ Eβ, i.e. EαEβ = EβEα = 0, so that none of the two
systems is individuated by the other’s criterion. (The importance of this condition will
soon become clear.) Call the system individuated by Eα the α-system, and the system
individuated by Eβ, the β-system.
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Figure 1: The intertwiners between the joint Hilbert spaces E
[
H
(2)
+
]
, E
[
H
(2)
−
]
and
Eα[H] ⊗ Eβ[H]. The square on the left represents H(2) in some product basis and the
square on the right represents H(2) in the corresponding “symmetry basis”, in which all
fermion states (blue) and all boson states (red) are grouped together.
Now define the following projector on H(2):
E := Eα ⊗ Eβ + Eβ ⊗ Eα (8)
E is symmetric, i.e. it satisfies PI, and its range has non-zero components in both the
symmetric (H
(2)
+ ) and anti-symmetric (H
(2)
− ) joint Hilbert spaces.
I now claim that both E
[
H
(2)
+
]
(bosonic) and E
[
H
(2)
−
]
(fermionic) have natural de-
compositions into the single-system spaces Eα[H] and Eβ[H]. I call these subspaces
individuation blocks.
To prove this, we need to establish both that: (i) the single-system spaces have an
identifiable single-system interpretation; and (ii) the joint Hilbert spaces E
[
H
(2)
+
]
and
E
[
H
(2)
−
]
are unitary equivalent to Eα[H]⊗ Eβ[H].
The first condition is satisfied, since Eα[H] and Eβ[H] are just subspaces of the
familiar single-system Hilbert space H, and we may preserve all physical interpretations
under the projections by the individuation criteria Eα and Eβ.
The second condition is satisfied, since we can provide the explicit forms of the
intertwiners between the three joint Hilbert spaces; they are given in Figure 1. (It may
be helpful to point out that, while these operators are not unitaries on the whole of H(2),
they are when restricted to their relevant domains so long as Eα and Eβ are orthogonal.)
In a little more detail, select for example any two single-system operators A and B on
H. Then EαAEα ⊗EβBEβ belongs to the tensor product algebra B(Eα[H]⊗Eβ[H]) ∼=
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B(Eα[H])⊗ B(Eβ[H]), and is sent to
EαAEα ⊗ EβBEβ + EαAEα ⊗ EβBEβ (9)
under the intertwiner U± : Eα[H]⊗Eβ[H]→ E
[
H
(2)
±
]
, where U± := 1√2(1± P (12)). U±
also clearly sends product states |φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉, where |φ〉 ∈ Eα[H], |χ〉 ∈ Eβ[H] to states of
the form 1√
2
(|φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉 ± |χ〉 ⊗ |φ〉).
The foregoing results apply to any subspace E [H(2)], as defined in (8), so long
as Eα ⊥ Eβ, and we can straightforwardly generalise to assemblies of more than two
systems.
A class of instances of qualitative individuation that is of particular interest arises
when the single-system Hilbert space H represents more than one degree of freedom.
In this case, if the individuation criteria Eα, Eβ apply to less than the full degrees of
freedom, then the full algebra of linear bounded operators on the remaining degrees of
freedom is available to the qualitatively individuated systems.
For simplicity, suppose that H represents two degrees of freedom; i.e., H = H1⊗H2.
Now let us choose the individuation criteria Eα = eα ⊗ 1, Eβ = eβ ⊗ 1, where eα and
eβ act on H1 and 1 is the identity on H2. From the results above, it follows that the
algebra of the α-system Aα = B(ran(Eα)) = B(ran(eα))⊗B(H2) and the algebra of the
β-system is Aβ = B(ran(Eβ)) = B(ran(eβ)) ⊗ B(H2). Thus the full algebra B(H2) is
available to both qualitatively individuated systems (cf. Figure 2(b)).12
Finally, we may wish to consider individuating by multiple individuation blocks. We
may break down the entire joint Hilbert space H
(2)
± into those subspaces that do count
as individuation blocks and those that do not, and then provide natural decompositions
for each of the off-diagonal subspaces. Each individuation block is associated with its
own pair of qualitatively individuated systems, and thus behaves in its own right like a
joint Hilbert space representing an assembly of two distinguishable systems; cf. Figure
2(a).
In more detail: We may decompose the single-system Hilbert space H using a com-
plete family of projectors {Ei},
∑
iEi = 1:
H =
(∑
i
Ei
)
H =
⊕
i
Ei[H] =:
⊕
i
Hi (10)
12This case corresponds to Huggett and Imbo’s (2009, pp. 315-6) ‘approximately distinguishable’
systems.
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Figure 2: (a) The (anti-) symmetric projection of the tensor product of two Hilbert
spaces may be decomposed into spaces which exhibit a tensor product structure. (Light
grey squares indicate condensed states, which remain under symmetrization but not
anti-symmetrization.) (b) If the two Hilbert spaces are decomposed into eigensubspaces
of only one degree of freedom, then the “off-diagonal” elements of the decomposition
serve as irreps for the full algebra of operators for the other degrees of freedom.
Then, with S± the appropriate symmetry projector, the joint Hilbert space is
H
(2)
± = S±
[(⊕
i
Hi
)
⊗
(⊕
i
Hi
)]
(11)
= S±
⊕
i
(Hi ⊗Hi)⊕
⊕
i<j
[(Hi ⊗Hj)⊕ (Hj ⊗Hi)]
 (12)
=
⊕
i
S± (Hi ⊗Hi)⊕
⊕
i<j
S± [(Hi ⊗Hj)⊕ (Hj ⊗Hi)] (13)
=
⊕
i
S± (Hi ⊗Hi)⊕
⊕
i<j
U± (Hi ⊗Hj)U †± (14)
where U± is the intertwiner defined above. Each (i, j) term on the RHS of (14) corre-
sponds to an individuation block.
One might hope to cover, as far as possible, the entire joint Hilbert space H
(2)
± with
individuation blocks, so that one achieves a decomposition of the full joint space after all.
However, these hopes are forlorn, for two reasons. First, in the case of bosons, multiply
occupied states (of the form |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) will never lie in any individuation block, since it
would require individuation criteria to become non-orthogonal. These states are always
out of reach. Second, in all cases, the imposition of multiple sets of individuation criteria
induces a superselection rule between individuation blocks, since the unitary equivalence
results above rely only to each individuation block in isolation. Therefore one cannot
impose multiple sets of individuation criteria without losing information about the joint
state.
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3.4 Is Permutation Invariance compulsory?
Here is an appropriate place to make some brief comments about Huggett and Imbo’s
(2009, pp. 313) recent claim that it is not necessary to impose permutation invariance
on systems with identical “intrinsic” (state-independent) properties. This is because,
they claim, systems may be distinguished according to their ‘trajectories’ (i.e. single-
system states). If they are correct, this would entail that factorism is, after all, a viable
interpretative position for such systems—so long as we understand factor Hilbert space
labels as representing these trajectories (just as, in the case of distinguishable systems,
we use factor Hilbert space labels to represent distinct state-independent properties of
the systems).
The results of this section show that Huggett and Imbo are partly correct. In my
jargon: they are right that an un-symmetrised Hilbert space is an equally adequate
(since unitarily equivalent) means to represent an assembly of qualitatively individuated
systems—for those states in which the individuation criteria succeed ; and that therefore
there is no practical need to impose IP, or, therefore, to repudiate factorism when rep-
resented those states and those states alone. But they are wrong to claim that it is not
necessary to impose PI to represent all of the available states for systems with identical
intrinsic properties. For the unitary equivalence result above, on which Huggett and
Imbo’s claim depends, holds only for the appropriate individuation block. As soon as
the assembly’s state has components that lie outside of this subspace, the equivalence
breaks down.
I must emphasise too that the breakdown of unitary equivalence outside of the rel-
evant individuation block does not just mean that, for states outside this subspace, the
two formalisms yield conflicting empirical claims (which come down in favour of PI).
Rather, the quasi-factorist formalism ceases to make physical sense for states outside of
the relevant individuation block. For, outside of this subspace, the systems no longer oc-
cupy the states upon which their individuation—and therefore the entire quasi-factorist
formalism—was based.
Huggett and Imbo mistakenly suppose that imposing PI prevents one from quali-
tatively individuating systems. (As Huggett and Imbo (2009, p. 315) put it: ‘[PI] ⇒
trajectory indistinguishability’.) But that inference assumes what I deny: namely, fac-
torism. Without factorism, we can agree with Huggett and Imbo that systems may be
qualitatively individuated, without contravening PI. Moreover: without factorism but
with PI, we may represent all of the states available to the assembly, without fear that
our representational apparatus will break down.
3.5 Russellian vs. Strawsonian approaches to individuation
All of the results of the previous sections apply only to joint states that have non-zero
support within some individuation block. This is the subspace for which the individua-
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tion criteria for the systems fully succeeds; i.e. for which the projector
E(α, β) := Eα ⊗ Eβ + Eβ ⊗ Eα (15)
has eigenvalue 1. What about states for which individuation does not succeed? The
question is important, since we want a procedure for calculating expectation values of
quantities which belong to the joint algebra of the qualitatively individuated quantities;
and we want that procedure to be as general as possible.
The way to proceed depends on one’s stance toward reference failure for individuation
criteria. I see two equally acceptable routes, which may be associated (a little tenden-
tiously) with the classic debate over reference failure for definite descriptions. With a
little poetic licence, I call the two routes Russellian and Strawsonian.
The Russellian route (cf. Russell 1905) takes the claim of success of the individuation
criteria Eα and Eβ to be an implicit additional claim to any explicit claim which imple-
ments those criteria. Thus the expectation value for any quantity Q ∈ B
(
E(α, β)
[
H
(2)
±
])
is given by
〈Q〉(R)(α,β) := Tr(E(α, β)ρE(α, β)Q), (16)
which uses the usual quantum mechanical specifications for expressing conjunction. But
Q commutes with E(α, β), since it is a sum of products of single-system quantities, each
of which commutes with Eα and Eβ. So (16) may be simplified to Tr(ρE(α, β)Q).
The Strawsonian route (cf. Strawson 1950) instead takes the joint success of the indi-
viduation criteria Eα and Eβ as a presupposition of any claim which uses that strategy.
Therefore any expectation values calculated under the presupposition of the success of
E(α, β) must be renormalized by conditionalizing on that success. This is done using
the usual Lu¨der rule
ρ 7→ ραβ := E(α, β)ρE(α, β)
Tr(ρE(α, β)) . (17)
The expectation value of any quantity Q ∈ B
(
E(α, β)
[
H
(2)
±
])
is then given simply by
〈Q〉(S)(α,β) := Tr(ραβQ).
Note that conditionalization requires that Tr(ρE(α, β)) > 0, which means that the
state must have some support in the individuation block. The fact that Tr(ραβQ) is
undefined when Tr(ρE(α, β)) = 0 meshes rather nicely with Strawson’s well-known claim
that statements containing failed definite descriptions do not possess a truth value.
It will have been noted that the difference between the Russellian and Strawsonian
routes for expectation values lies only in the multiplicative factor 1Tr(ρE(α,β)) . A point
in favour of the Strawsonian approach is that the identity 1
H
(2)
±
has expectation value
〈1
H
(2)
±
〉(S)(α,β) = 1 for all normalizable states, while under the Russellian route the identity’s
expectation value is equal to E(α, β)’s expectation value, which may take any value from
0 to 1. A point in favour of the Russellian approach is that expectation values may be
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Eα
Eα
Figure 3: The action of the number operator nα on the joint Hilbert space H
(2). Blue
squares represent fermion states and red squares represent boson states. Light squares
represent the nα = 0 eigenspace; medium squares represent the nα = 1 eigenspace; and
dark squares represent the nα = 2 eigenspace.
defined for all states. On this approach, if the assembly’s state has no support in the
individuation block, then expectation value for every quantity is zero.
4 Individuating single systems
In this section, I turn away from the problem of completely decomposing an assembly into
constituent systems, and turn instead to the problem of picking out a single constituent
system from the assembly. I seek a means to calculate expectation values for quantities
associated with a single qualitatively individuated system, whose individuation criterion
we may choose.
4.1 Expectation values for constituent systems
The way I will proceed is inspired in part by the Strawsonian approach to individuation
in Section 3.5. The main idea, there and here, is to conditionalize upon the success of
the individuation. As usual, I work, for the sake of simplicity, in the N = 2 case (unless
otherwise stated); the generalization to N > 2 will be obvious.
We begin with a chosen individuation criterion, a projector Eα, which acts on the
single-system Hilbert space H. Then it may be checked that the operator
nα := Eα ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ Eα (18)
is a number operator for the two-system assembly’s Hilbert space. That is, it “counts”
the number of systems which are picked out by Eα. It is represented in Figure 3.
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We now define a linear map piα : B(H) → B
(
H
(2)
±
)
from the single-system algebra
into the joint algebra of the assembly, which takes single-system operators and gives the
appropriate operator on the joint Hilbert space associated with the α-system:
piα(Q) := EαQEα ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ EαQEα. (19)
(Note that, if Q = EαQEα, then piα is just the symmetrizer for Q.)
I now claim that the expectation value for any single-system quantity Q, associated
with “the” α-system is given by
〈Q〉α := 〈piα(Q)〉〈nα〉 . (20)
I will establish this claim by considering a few examples.
1. The state of the assembly |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|α〉 ⊗ |β〉 ± |β〉 ⊗ |α〉), where Eα|α〉 = |α〉 and
Eα|β〉 = 0, and Q|α〉 = q|α〉. Then 〈nα〉 = 1 and 〈piα(Q)〉 = q; so 〈Q〉α = q.
That is, the system individuated by Eα takes as its expectation for Q the value q,
associated with the state |α〉, for which individuation succeeds (i.e., the state that
it is in the range of Eα). (Indeed, the α-system is in an eigenstate for Q, since
〈Q2〉α = q2.)
2. |ψ〉 = c1 1√2 (|α1〉 ⊗ |β1〉 ± |β1〉 ⊗ |α1〉)+c2
1√
2
(|α2〉 ⊗ |β2〉 ± |β2〉 ⊗ |α2〉), where |c1|2+
|c2|2 = 1; and for all i = 1, 2: Eα|αi〉 = |αi〉 and Eα|βi〉 = 0, and Q|αi〉 = qi|αi〉.
Then 〈nα〉 = 1 and 〈piα(Q)〉 = |c1|2q1 + |c2|2q2; so 〈Q〉α = |c1|2q1 + |c2|2q2. That
is, the system individuated by Eα takes as its expectation for Q the average for
all single-system states |αi〉, for which the individuation succeeds. The weights for
this average are given by the relative amplitudes of the non-GM-entangled terms.
3. |ψ〉 = |α〉⊗|α〉, for |α〉 as above. Then 〈nα〉 = 2 and 〈piα(Q)〉 = 2q; so 〈Q〉α = q. In
this case, Eα individuates two systems, and the expectation (indeed, eigenvalue)
for Q for both of them is q.
4. |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|α1〉 ⊗ |α2〉 ± |α2〉 ⊗ |α1〉), for |α1〉, |α2〉 as above. Then 〈nα〉 = 2 and
〈piα(Q)〉 = q1 + q2; so 〈Q〉α = 12(q1 + q2). In this case, Eα again individuates two
systems, one whose expectation value for Q is q1, and one whose value is q2; thus
we take the average. However, the weights for this average are not given, as above,
by relative amplitudes for non-GM-entangled terms; (the entire state is non-GM-
entangled). Rather, they are given by the relative frequency, in a single non-GM-
entangled state, of each single-system state for which individuation succeeds.
5. |ψ〉 = c1U± (|α1〉 ⊗ |α2〉 ⊗ |β1〉) + c2U± (|α3〉 ⊗ |β1〉 ⊗ |β2〉), where U± is the in-
tertwiner which (anti-) symmetrizes product states, and the single-system states
are defined as before. (So N = 3; and for simplicity we set aside paraparti-
cles.) Then 〈nα〉 = 2|c1|2 + |c2|2 and 〈piα(Q)〉 = |c1|2(q1 + q2) + |c2|2q3; so
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〈Q〉α = |c1|
2(q1+q2)+|c2|2q3
2|c1|2+|c2|2 . In this case, the weights for the average are deter-
mined jointly by relative amplitudes and relative frequencies. If |c1| = |c2|, then
〈Q〉α = 13(q1+q2+q3); thus each of the three states in the range of Eα are afforded
equal weight, whether or not they belong to the same non-GM-entangled term.
Thus my claim—that the expectation value of any single-system quantity Q, for the
system qualitatively individuated by Eα, is given by (20)—yields the right results, at
least for cases 1 to 4. Case 5 seems to me less clear cut, since one might favour a different
way to calculate statistical weights from the relative amplitudes and relative frequencies.
However, I submit, there are no clear intuitions to rely on in this case, and I can see no
objection to the way given by (20).
The map piα does not constitute an isomorphism between the single-system algebra
B(H)—or indeed any subalgebra thereof—and the range of piα. It is not even a homo-
morphism. For example, it may be checked that piα(AB) 6= piα(A)piα(B) does not hold,
even for all those A,B ∈ B(H) that commute with Eα.
This is not an objection to (20), and should come as no surprise. For there are states
of the assembly in which Eα fails to individuate a unique system (cf. examples 3-5,
above). In these states, we should not expect that piα(AB) = piα(A)piα(B). To perform
the operation B, followed by A, on a given α-system (corresponding to piα(AB)) relies
on a re-identification of that system (and that system alone) after we have operated
with B. But the individuation criterion Eα cannot be guaranteed to pick out that very
same system, if more than one system is picked out by Eα.
13 On the other hand, it may
be checked that, for any two states |ψ〉 of the assembly that are eigenstates of nα with
eigenvalue 1—i.e., for all states in which exactly one system is individuated by Eα—we
have 〈ψ|piα(AB)|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|piα(A)piα(B)|ψ〉, as expected.
4.2 Reduced density operators
Thus we have a recipe for calculating the expectation value of any single-system quantity
for a qualitatively individuated system or systems. It remains for me to give a general
prescription for calculating the reduced density operator for such a system. We require
that the reduced density operator ρα satisfy the condition that, for all Q ∈ B(H):
tr(ραQ) = 〈Q〉α, as given in (20) (I use the expression ‘tr’ with a lowercase ‘t’ to denote
the trace over the single-system Hilbert space H). We know from Gleason’s Theorem
that a unique such operator exists.
As usual, it is helpful to work by analogy with the case of “distinguishable” systems.
The usual prescription for the reduced density operator of a constituent system, say the
kth, of the assembly is (with ρ the state of the assembly):
ρk := Trk (ρ) , (21)
13It is worth emphasising that the possibility of multiple α-systems does not arise only for bosons,
since Eα need not be a one-dimensional projector.
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where Trk denotes a partial trace over all but the kth factor Hilbert space. Now this
prescription is obviously no use to anti-factorists; but an equivalent formulation to (21)
exists that will be of far more use. First we choose a complete orthobasis {|φi〉} for the
single-system Hilbert space H. Then
ρk :=
d∑
i,j
Tr (ρ|φj〉〈φi|k) |φi〉〈φj | (22)
where d := dim(H) and
|φj〉〈φi|k :=
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φj〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1 (23)
and we now perform a full trace on the joint Hilbert space in (22).
We may adapt (22) for qualitatively individuated systems in the following way. First,
we replace each operator |φj〉〈φi|k, which is indexed to a factor Hilbert space, with
piα(|φj〉〈φi|), as given in (19). And second, we “conditionalize” by dividing by 〈nα〉 =
Tr(ρnα). Thus
ρα =
1
〈nα〉
d∑
i,j
Tr [ρ piα(|φj〉〈φi|)] |φi〉〈φj | (24)
Written out in full, and for any N , we have
ρα =
d∑
i,j
|φi〉〈φj | Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ Eα|φj〉〈φi|Eα ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)]
Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ Eα ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)] (25)
We may arrange for the first dα := dim(Eα) basis states to span Eα[H]; in which case
ρα =
dα∑
i,j
|φi〉〈φj | Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φj〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)]
dα∑
i
Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φi〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)] (26)
It may then be shown (as required) that for any Q ∈ B(H), tr(ραQ) = 〈Q〉α. For
28
this, let {|ξi〉} be a complete eigenbasis for Q, where Q|ξi〉 = qi|ξi〉. Then
tr(ραQ) =
1
〈nα〉
d∑
i,j,k
Tr [ρ piα(|ξj〉〈ξi|)] 〈ξk|ξi〉〈ξj |Q|ξk〉 (27)
=
1
〈nα〉
d∑
i,j,k
qkTr [ρ piα(|ξj〉〈ξi|)] δkiδjk (28)
=
1
〈nα〉
d∑
k
Tr [ρ qk piα(|ξk〉〈ξk|)] (29)
=
1
〈nα〉Tr
[
ρ piα
(
d∑
k
qk |ξk〉〈ξk|
)]
(30)
=
1
〈nα〉Tr (ρ piα (Q)) (31)
=: 〈Q〉α. (32)
Remember that ρα as given in (24) and (25) is the average state of any system
individuated by Eα. So long as the state ρ is an eigenstate of nα with eigenvalue 1—or
even a superposition of nα = 0 and nα = 1 eigenstates—then ρα yields the state of
the α-system. However, if ρ contains eigenstates with nα > 1, then the interpretation
of ρα as the state of the α-system can no longer be sustained, since in those terms we
effectively average over all systems picked out by Eα.
To conclude this section, I note two important limiting cases of Equation (24). The
first is when we are maximally discriminating in our individuation; i.e., where Eα is a
one-dimensional projector. Let |α〉 be the state for which Eα|α〉 = |α〉. Then, so long
as 〈nα〉 > 0, ρα = |α〉〈α|, which is to be expected. In this case the α-system is a Fock
space quantum, the object that is added to the field with the creation operator a†(α).
The second limiting case lies at the other extreme, in which we individuate with
maximum indiscriminateness, i.e. with Eα = 1. In this case 〈nα〉 = N and piα(A) =∑N
k=1
⊗k−1
1⊗A⊗⊗N−k 1; so
ρα =
1
N
d∑
i,j
|φi〉〈φj | Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φj〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)]
(33)
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
d∑
i,j
|φi〉〈φj | Tr
[
ρ
(
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φj〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)]
(34)
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
d∑
i,j
|φi〉〈φj | Tr [ρ (|φj〉〈φi|k)] (from (23)) (35)
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
ρk (from (22)). (36)
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So with maximum indiscriminateness ρα is the “average” of the standard reduced density
operators obtained by partial tracing. However, under PI we of course have ρ1 = ρ2 =
. . . = ρk =: ρ, in which case ρα = ρ. Thus we may say that, under PI, standard reduced
density operators obtained by partial tracing codify only the state of the average system,
and not the state of any particular system. In this sense, the factorist may be accused
of committing the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, as when one takes the “average
taxpayer” to be a real person.
The definition of ρ as the average reduced state obtained by partial trace also allows
a more elegant expression for the reduced density operator ρα for the α-system. From
(26), we have
ρα =
dα∑
i,j
|φi〉〈φj | Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φj〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)]
dα∑
i
Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φi〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)] (37)
=
d∑
i,j
Eα|φi〉〈φj |Eα Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φj〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)]
tr

d∑
i,j
Eα|φi〉〈φj |Eα Tr
[
ρ
(
N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φj〉〈φi| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
)]
(38)
=
EαρEα
tr(ρEα)
. (39)
Thus ρα is obtained from the “average state” ρ by the usual Lu¨der’s rule, where we
conditionalize on the single-system’s state lying in Eα[H].
4.3 Qualitative individuation in Fock space
Expectation values and reduced density operators for Fock space. Fock space is just the
direct sum of the N -system Hilbert spaces we have been separately considering:
F±(H) :=
∞⊕
N=0
S(N)±
(
N⊗
H
)
=:
∞⊕
N=0
H
(N)
± (40)
(where S(N)± is the N -system (anti-) symmetrization operator, where ‘+’ corresponds to
bosons, i.e. symmetrization, and ‘−’ to fermions, i.e. anti-symmetrization). The general-
ization to Fock space is straightforward, which vindicates the claim that anti-factorism
about quantum mechanics meshes with quantum field theory in the limit of conserved
total particle number. We already have a prescription for calculating expectation values
and reduced density operators for a system individuated by any criterion Eα in a joint
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Hilbert space of N systems. The strategy between the Fock space generalizations of
these prescriptions is simply to act separately according to them on subspaces of Fock
space characterized by total particle number N .
First we define the “number operator” on Fock space as
nα :=
∞⊕
N=0
n(N)α (41)
=
∞⊕
N=0
 N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ Eα ⊗
N−k⊗
1
∣∣∣∣∣
H
(N)
±
 (42)
The appropriate function from the single-system algebra to the Fock space algebra
pi±α : B(H) → B(F±(H)) is then defined by its action on an arbitrary single-system
operator Q:
pi±α (Q) =
∞⊕
N=0
 N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ EαQEα ⊗
N−k⊗
1
∣∣∣∣∣
H
(N)
±
 (43)
and we have pi±α (1) = nα, as expected. and Expectation values for any single-system
beable A are given by 〈Q〉α = 〈pi
±
α (Q)〉
〈nα〉 . While the single-system expectation operator
〈·〉α : D(H) × B(H) → C is as usual, now 〈·〉 : D(F±(H)) × B(F±(H)) → C is the
expectation operation on density operators and bounded operators on Fock space.
Connections to the Fock space formalism. It will be instructive to connect the expressions
above to the more familiar aspects of the Fock space formalism, viz. particle creation,
annihilation and numbers operators. Recall that we may define an annihilation operator-
valued function a : H → B(F±(H)), which takes any single-system state φ ∈ H to the
annihilation operator a(φ), defined by its action on an arbitrary state Ψ of F±(H) (in
tensor notation; see Geroch (2005, 29)):
Ψ = ξ0 ⊕ ξ1ψa(1) ⊕ ξ2ψab(2) ⊕ . . .⊕ ξNψa1...aN(N) ⊕ . . . (44)
(where ψ(1)aψ
a
(1) = ψ(2)abψ
ab
(2) = . . . = ψ(N)a1...aN
ψa1...aN(N) = 1; i.e. each N -system state is
normalized) as follows:
a(φ)Ψ = ξ1φnψ
n
(1) ⊕
√
2ξ2φnψ
na
(2) ⊕ . . .⊕
√
N + 1ξN+1φnψ
na1...aN
(N+1) ⊕ . . . (45)
And we similarly define the creation operator-valued function a† : H → B(F±(H)), where
the creation operator a†(φ) is defined by its action on Ψ as follows:
a†(φ)Ψ = 0⊕ ξ0φa ⊕
√
2ξ1φ
[aψ
b]±
(1) ⊕ . . .⊕
√
NξN−1φ[a1ψ
a2...aN ]±
(N−1) ⊕ . . . (46)
Then the action of the number operator Nˆ(φ) := a†(φ)a(φ) is
Nˆ(φ)Ψ = 0⊕ ξ1φaφnψn(1) ⊕ 2ξ2φ[aφnψ|n|b]±(2) ⊕ . . .⊕NξNφ[a1φnψ
|n|a2...aN ]±
(N) ⊕ . . . (47)
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These definitions, combined with the (anti-) symmetry of Ψ, entail the identity
Nˆ(φ) ≡
∞⊕
N=0
 N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φ〉〈φ| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
∣∣∣∣∣
H
(N)
±
 (48)
(Proof sketch: We consider separately the action of Nˆ(φ) on each N -system com-
ponent Ψ|
H
(N)
±
of an arbitrary state Ψ ∈ F±(H), and demonstrate the identity for
each component. Consider for example the N = 2 component. From (47) we have
Nˆ(φ)Ψ|
H
(2)
±
= 2ξ2φ
[aφnψ
|n|b]±
(2) ≡ ξ2(φaφnψnb(2)±φbφnψna(2)). But due to the (anti-) symme-
try of Ψ, ψna(2) = ±ψan(2), so we have Nˆ(φ)Ψ|H(2)± = ξ2(φ
aφnψ
nb
(2)+φ
bφnψ
an
(2)) ≡ ξ2(φaφmδbn+
δamφ
bφn)ψ
mn
(2) ≡ (|φ〉〈φ| ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ |φ〉〈φ|)Ψ|H(2)± , in agreement with (48).) It may also be
checked that the usual (anti-) commutation relations hold, for all φ, χ ∈ H:
[a(φ), a(χ)]∓ = [a†(φ), a†(χ)]∓ = 0; [a(φ), a†(χ)]∓ = φnχn ≡ 〈φ|χ〉, (49)
where ‘−’ now corresponds to bosons (commutation) and ’+’ to fermions (anti-commutation).
Now select some orthonormal basis {|φi〉}; i = 1, . . . , dα := dim(Eα) that spans the
space Eα[H]. Then Eα =
∑dα
i=1 |φi〉〈φi| and (combining (42) and (48)),
nα =
dα∑
i=1
Nˆ(φi) (50)
This justifies our calling nα a “number operator” in the first place—in fact nα is just a
generalisation of the usual Fock space number operators, in which we are typically less
than maximally specific about the single-system state whose occupancy we are counting.
If we set Eα = |α〉〈α| for some single-particle state α ∈ H (the limit of maximum
specificity), then nα = Nˆ(α). If we set Eα = 1 (the limit of maximum non-specificity),
then nα = Nˆ , the total number operator, defined by
Nˆ := 0⊕ 1H ⊕ 21H(2)± ⊕ . . .⊕N1H(N)± ⊕ . . . . (51)
Thus nα determines a spectrum of number operators, reflecting the spectrum of speci-
ficity of our chosen individuation criterion Eα, parameterized by its dimension dα, with
the familiar state number operators and total number operator at opposite extremes.
The function pi±α may be re-expressed as follows:
pi±α (Q) =
∞⊕
N=0
 N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗
(
dα∑
i=1
|φi〉〈φi|
)
Q
 dα∑
j=1
|φj〉〈φj |
⊗ N−k⊗ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
H
(N)
±
 (52)
=
dα∑
i,j=1
〈φi|Q|φj〉
∞⊕
N=0
 N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φi〉〈φj | ⊗
N−k⊗
1
∣∣∣∣∣
H
(N)
±
 (53)
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We now make use of the identity
a†(φ)a(χ) ≡
∞⊕
N=0
 N∑
k=1
k−1⊗
1⊗ |φ〉〈χ| ⊗
N−k⊗
1
∣∣∣∣∣
H
(N)
±
 (54)
(which may be verified, as with Nˆ(φ) above, by considering the action on each N -system
component of an arbitrary Fock space state) to re-express (53) as
pi±α (Q) =
dα∑
i,j=1
〈φi|Q|φj〉 a†(φi)a(φj) (55)
And the general expression for the expectation value of Q for the α-system is
〈Q〉α =
dα∑
i,j=1
〈
a†(φi)a(φj)
〉
〈φi|Q|φj〉
dα∑
i=1
〈
a†(φi)a(φi)
〉 (56)
If Q has the |φi〉 as eigenstates (Q|φi〉 = qi|φi〉)—which may always be arranged if
Q commutes with the individuation criterion; [Q,Eα] = 0—then (56) simplifies to the
reassuring expression
〈Q〉α =
∑dα
i=1〈Nˆ(φi)〉qi∑dα
i=1〈Nˆ(φi)〉
(57)
which has a straightforward physical interpretation as being the average eigenvalue for
A of all Fock space quanta whose state satisfies the individuation criterion Eα. If the
single-system operator and individuation criterion do not commute ([Q,Eα] 6= 0), then
the cross-terms in (55) survive, and will manifest experimentally as interference between
the single-system states |φi〉.
A reduced density operator associated with the individuation criterion Eα can also be
defined for Fock space, so that 〈Q〉α = Tr(ραQ), for all Q ∈ B(H). Given an orthonormal
basis {|φi〉} for H, we have (cf. (24), above),
ρα =
d∑
i,j
|φi〉〈φj | 〈|φj〉〈φi|〉α (58)
We can arrange for the first dα basis states to span Eα[H], in which case
ρα =
dα∑
i,j
〈
a†(φi)a(φj)
〉
|φi〉〈φj |
dα∑
i=1
〈
a†(φi)a(φi)
〉 (59)
which is clearly a positive operator (since Nˆ(φi) is, for all φi ∈ H) with unit trace.
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4.4 Ubiquitous and unique systems
In section 4.1 above, I deliberately defined a procedure for calculating expectation values
for qualitatively individuated systems that does not depend on the joint state being an
nα = 1 eigenstate. This has advantages for purposes of generality, but individuation
criteria Eα for which the joint state is an nα = 1 eigenstate, and their associated sys-
tems, are also extremely useful. This is because they are anti-factorist surrogates for
“distinguishable” systems, which are identifiable in all states by the same factor Hilbert
space label—and their individuation criteria are the anti-factorist surrogates for factor
Hilbert space labels. I will call such systems ubiquitous and unique: ubiquitous, because
some single-particle state in Eα[H] is occupied in each term of the joint state; unique,
because such states occur only once in each such term.
Ubiquitous and unique systems, like “distinguishable” systems, probe the entire joint
state, and never appear more than once; so their reduced states give valuable information
about the joint state. In particular, they will be helpful in the next section (5.4) in
providing a means to define a continuous measure of entanglement for the joint state.
If the α-system is ubiquitous and unique, then we have by definition Tr(ρnα) = 1 for
the joint state ρ. But nα = NΣ
(N)(Eα ⊗ 1⊗ . . .⊗ 1), so
Tr(ρnα) = 1 = NTr
[
ρΣ(N)
(
Eα ⊗
N−1⊗
1
)]
(60)
=
1
(N − 1)!
∑
pi∈SN
Tr
[
ρP (pi)
(
Eα ⊗
N−1⊗
1
)
P †(pi)
]
(61)
= NTr
[
ρ
(
Eα ⊗
N−1⊗
1
)]
(62)
= Ntr (ρ1Eα) (63)
= Ntr (ρEα) (64)
where in the third step we use the cyclicity of the trace function and the fact that
P (pi)ρP †(pi) = ρ, due to PI; in the fourth step we use the definition of the partial trace;
and in the fifth step we use the fact that ρ1 = ρ when PI is imposed. Thus for ubiquitous
and unique systems individuated by Eα,
tr(ρEα) =
1
N
. (65)
and the expression (39) for the reduced density operator for “the” α-system simplifies
to
ρα = NEαρEα. (66)
This has the following mathematical interpretation. If ρ is written in matrix form, in a
basis such that the first dα states span Eα[H], then the top-left block of this matrix—
given by EαρEα—is the matrix
1
N ρα.
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Similar results follow for the β-system, and so on. So if a full N ubiquitous and
unique systems (with mutually orthogonal individuation criteria) can be found for the
entire joint state—which will be the case iff the joint state lies in an individuation block—
then Nρ can be put into a block-diagonal form with all of the qualitatively individuated
systems’ states as the diagonal entries:
Nρ =
 ρα ρβ
. . .
 (67)
(where there are N diagonal blocks). We see here quite vividly that ρ represents the
“average state” of the constituent systems. This result will come in useful in the next
section.
5 Entanglement
In this section I draw out the implications of anti-factorism for the notion of entangle-
ment. First (section 5.1) I say why the traditional definition, in terms of non-separability,
needs supplanting. Then in section 5.2, I will connect these considerations with recent
heterodox proposals for defining entanglement, or “quantum correlations”, in the con-
text of permutation invariance, and I present two results which secure the suitability of
the agreed definition, and in section 5.4 offer a continuous measure for the notion; it will
turn out to have a simple relation to the familiar von Neumann entropy of the reduced
state.
5.1 Against non-separability
If anti-factorism is right, then nothing in the formalism with physical significance can
depend on the ordering of the factor Hilbert spaces in the joint Hilbert space. But this
immediately compels a distinction between two kinds of non-separability that a joint
state may exhibit.
Separability, I take it, is a purely formal notion (at least, I will here take it to be):
an N -system joint state |Ψ〉 is separable iff there is a basis of the single-system Hilbert
space H for which |Ψ〉 is some N -fold tensor product of those basis states. But a joint
state may fail to be separable purely because it is a superposition of product states which
differ only by how single-system states are distributed among the factor Hilbert spaces
(e.g. |φ〉⊗ |χ〉 and |χ〉⊗ |φ〉). Under the superselection rule induced by PI, the only such
(pure) joint states are of the form
|ψ±(φ)〉 = 1√
N !
∑
pi∈SN
(±1)#(pi)P (pi)|φ(1)〉 ⊗ |φ(2)〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |φ(N)〉 (68)
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where φ : {1, . . . , N} → {1, . . . , d} and {|1〉, . . . , |d〉} is an orthonormal basis for H (so φ
may be thought of as a function that takes factor Hilbert space labels to single-system
states). In the case of bosons we allow φ not to be injective, but in that case the state
in (68) is not properly normalized.
If φ is injective, then the joint state |ψ±(φ)〉 lies in an individuation block in H(N)± —in
fact, it lies in a 1-dimensional individuation block. The corresponding N individuation
criteria, which are 1-dimensional, are Ei = |φ(i)〉〈φ(i)|, i = 1, 2, . . . N . Following our in-
terpretative principle (above, section 2.4) that intertwiners between unitarily equivalent
reps preserve physical interpretations, we are compelled to give the same interpretation
to |ψ±(φ)〉 that we give to each of the product states P (pi)|φ(1)〉⊗ . . .⊗ |φ(N)〉 when PI
is not imposed. But in these states, being separable, are unentangled. It follows that,
if entanglement is to be a physical, rather than formal, concept, then we ought also to
construe states of the form (68) as unentangled. (I have overlooked what to say about
joint states of that form in which φ is not injective: this will be remedied in the following
section.)
Some readers may baulk at this suggestion. After all, the spin singlet state for two
qubits,
1√
2
(|↑〉 ⊗ |↓〉 − |↓〉 ⊗ |↑〉), (69)
has the form (68), yet this is the most commonly mentioned state in discussions of
entanglement and in derivations of Bell-type inequalities (e.g. Bell (1976))! How could
the paradigm of an entangled state not count as entangled on a “physical” understanding
of that concept?
The resolution to this little puzzle is simply that we need to be more careful about
whether PI is or isn’t being imposed. In almost all textbook treatments, PI is not
imposed and one derives a Bell inequality which the singlet state violates. The key
beables in that exercise are of the form σi⊗1 or 1⊗ σj (and constructions out of these,
chiefly σi ⊗ σj), which manifestly make non-trivial use of the ordering of the factor
Hilbert spaces, and therefore do not satisfy PI. These beables belong to an algebra of
operators defined on the full joint Hilbert space H(2) = C4 ∼= C2 ⊗ C2. In short: the
constituent systems are treated as “distinguishable”.
If the systems are treated as “indistinguishable”—i.e., when PI is imposed—then the
singlet state constitutes the only state accessible to two fermions; i.e. H
(2)
− = C. The
corresponding joint algebra is B(C) ∼= C, i.e. only c-numbers, which is far too meagre
to accommodate the violation of a Bell inequality—it is too meagre even to define spin
operators for each of the constituent systems (construed factoristically)!
In fact we know that the real-world systems whose spin-measurements violate Bell
inequalities do not only possess spin as a degree of freedom. (This point and its implica-
tions are well put by Ladyman et al (2013, 216).) If we are pedantic about this, we ought
also to include the spatial degrees of freedom. (After all, Stern-Gerlach apparatuses exist
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in space!) Let us therefore consider the following four -component state:
1
2
(|L〉1 ⊗ |R〉2 + |R〉1 ⊗ |L〉2)⊗ (|↑〉1 ⊗ |↓〉2 − |↓〉1 ⊗ |↑〉2), (70)
(where I have used labels to keep track of the single-system factor Hilbert spaces). This
state lies in the fermionic joint Hilbert space, and is not of the form (68), so it counts
as entangled even according to the current heterodox proposal. Accordingly, it may be
shown that it yields the same Bell-inequality-violating spin measurements in the context
of PI as the singlet state does when PI is not imposed.
The equivalence is demonstrated by appealing to qualitative individuation. We
choose our individuation criteria for the two constituent systems to be EL := |L〉〈L| ⊗
1spin and ER := |R〉〈R| ⊗ 1spin. Then it may be checked that, by (9), the operators in
the joint algebra corresponding to the spins (in units of 12~) of the systems qualitatively
individuated by EL and ER are
σi(L) := U−(σi ⊗ 1)U †− = (|L〉〈L| ⊗ σi)⊗ (|R〉〈R| ⊗ 1spin)
+ (|R〉〈R| ⊗ 1spin)⊗ (|L〉〈L| ⊗ σi) (71)
σi(R) := U−(1⊗ σi)U †− = (|R〉〈R| ⊗ σi)⊗ (|L〉〈L| ⊗ 1spin)
+ (|L〉〈L| ⊗ 1spin)⊗ (|R〉〈R| ⊗ σi) (72)
which, given the state (70), yield the spin-correlation expectation values
〈uiσi(L)vjσj(R)〉 = −uivi (73)
for any two unit spatial vectors ui and vi (where summation over repeated indices is
implied). This suffices to violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality∣∣∣〈ui1σi(L)vj1σj(R)〉+ 〈ui1σi(L)vj2σj(R)〉+ 〈ui2σi(L)vj1σj(R)〉 − 〈ui2σi(L)vj2σj(R)〉∣∣∣ 6 2
(74)
when suitable choices for ui1, v
i
1, u
i
2, v
i
2 are made (e.g. in the x-y plane: u1 = (0, 1);u2 =
(1, 0); v1 =
1√
2
(1, 1); v2 =
1√
2
(−1, 1)).
The singlet state, construed such that PI has not been imposed, is frequently used
as a simplifying surrogate for states of the form (70), for which PI has been imposed. (If
your interest is in discussing entanglement, why complicate matters by worrying about
permutation invariance?) That the singlet does serve as a suitable simplifying surrogate
is justified by appeal to the fact that it yields the spin-correlation expectation values
〈uiσi ⊗ vjσj〉 = −uivi, (75)
in agreement with (73).
It may also be of interest that the prescription (24) yields the following reduced
density operators for the state (70):
ρL = |L〉〈L| ⊗ 1
2
1spin; ρR = |R〉〈R| ⊗ 1
2
1spin (76)
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If we then trace out the spatial states, we obtain the density operator 121spin for each
qualitatively individuated system—which is normally associated with the (factoristically
construed!) constituent systems of the singlet state when IP is not imposed.
Finally, I note that the state
1√
2
(|L〉1 ⊗ |↑〉1 ⊗ |R〉2 ⊗ |↓〉2 − |R〉1 ⊗ |↓〉1 ⊗ |L〉2 ⊗ |↑〉2) (77)
which is of the form (68), and therefore according to the current proposal ought not
to count as entangled, does not violate the CHSH inequality (74) for any choice of
ui1, v
i
1, u
i
2, v
i
2, and gives the reduced density operators ρL = |L〉〈L|⊗|↑〉〈↑ |, ρR = |R〉〈R|⊗
|↓〉〈↓ | (i.e. pure states) for the constituent systems: two features which, non-separability
notwithstanding, we normally associate with the absence of entanglement.
5.2 Connections to the physics literature I: GMW-entanglement
The above considerations are found in a series of papers by Ghirardi, Marinatto and
Weber (Ghirardi, Marinatto & Weber (2002); Ghirardi & Marinatto (2003,2004,2005)).
They argue that the usual definition of entanglement (non-separability) can be naturally
adapted to quantum systems governed by PI in the way just shown. To avoid confusion
with non-separability, I will call their adapted definition, and the definition I wish here
to endorse, GMW-entanglement.
For simplicity, I assume N = 2; generalizations for N > 2 will be obvious. Following
Ghirardi, Marinatto and Weber (2002), define:
The indistinguishable constituents of a two-system assembly are non-GMW-
entangled (we may say the joint state is non-GMW-entangled) iff both sys-
tems have a complete set of properties.
(The assembly is then defined as GMW-entangled iff it is not non-GMW-entangled.)
And we define:
Given a joint state ρ of two “indistinguishable” systems, at least one of
the systems has a complete set of properties iff there exists a 1-dimensional
projector E, defined on H, such that:
Tr(ρE) = 1 (78)
where
E := E ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ E − E ⊗ E. (79)
Because E is 1-dimensional, Ghirardi and Marinatto say that at least one of the systems
has a ‘complete set of properties’. ‘Complete’ here picks up on the fact that E is minimal,
and therefore maximally specific (maximally logically strong) about the system’s state.
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This almost corresponds above to the two systems being qualitatively individuated by
the projectors E and E⊥ := (1−E). The difference is that E also projects onto doubly-
occupied joint states (which must be bosonic); thus we say ‘at least one system has a
complete set of properties’.
Ghirardi and Marinatto (2003, Theorems 4.2 & 4.3) then prove the following theorem:
At least one of the systems in a two-system assembly has a complete set
of properties iff the assembly’s state is obtained by symmetrizing or anti-
symmetrizing a separable state.
Here I give a quick sketch of their proof:
Right to left (easy half): If |Ψ〉 is obtained by symmetrizing or anti-symmetrizing a
factorized state of two indistinguishable constituents, then:
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2(1± |〈φ|χ〉|2) (|φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉 ± |χ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) . (80)
By expressing the state |χ〉 as
|χ〉 = α|φ〉+ β|φ⊥〉, 〈φ|φ⊥〉 = 0 (81)
and choosing E = |φ〉〈φ|, one gets immediately
Tr(ρE) ≡ 〈Ψ±|E|Ψ±〉 = 1. (82)
Left to Right (hard half): If one chooses a complete orthonormal set of single-system
states whose first element |φ0〉 := |φ〉 is such that E = |φ0〉〈φ0|, writing
|Ψ±〉 =
∑
ij
cij |φi〉 ⊗ |φj〉,
∑
ij
|cij |2 = 1, cji = ±cij , (83)
and, using the explicit expression for E in terms of E, one obtains:
E|Ψ±〉 = |φ0〉 ⊗
∑
j 6=0
c0j |φj〉
+
∑
j 6=0
cj0|φj〉
⊗ |φ0〉+ c00|φ0〉 ⊗ |φ0〉. (84)
But now imposing condition (78) entails that E|Ψ±〉 = |Ψ±〉.
In the case of fermions, c00 = 0. So, introducing a normalized vector |ξ〉 :=√
2
∑
j 6=0 c0j |φj〉, we obtain
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
( |φ0〉 ⊗ |ξ〉 − |ξ〉 ⊗ |φ0〉) , (85)
where 〈φ0|ξ〉 = 0. For bosons, defining the following normalized vector
|θ〉 = 1√
2− |c00|2
∑
j 6=0
2c0j |φj〉+ c00|φ0〉
 , (86)
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the two-particle state vector becomes
|Ψ+〉 = 1
2
√
2− |c00|2 (|φ0〉 ⊗ |θ〉+ |θ〉 ⊗ |φ0〉) . (87)
Note that in this case the states |φ0〉 and |θ〉 are orthogonal iff c00 = 0, in which case
|θ〉 = |ξ〉. 
Let us now consider GMW-entanglement specifically for fermions and bosons, re-
spectively.
GMW-entanglement for fermions. Since E ⊗ E = 0 on H(2)− , one can drop such a
term in all previous formulae. Accordingly, Ef := E ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ E.
Due to the orthogonality of |φ0〉 and |ξ〉, for the state (85), we conclude not only that
there is one fermion with a complete set of properties (given by |φ0〉) , but also that the
other fermion has a complete set of properties (given by |ξ〉).
So according to the definition of GMW-entanglement, we have proved:
The fermions of a two-system assembly, whose (pure) state is given by |Ψ−〉,
are non-GM-entangled iff |Ψ−〉 is obtained by anti-symmetrizing a separable
state.
GMW-entanglement for bosons. The broad similarity to fermions is clear, especially
from Equations (80) and (87). As for fermions, the requirement that one of the two
bosons has a complete set of properties entails that the state is obtained by symmetrizing
a separable state. However, there are some remarkable differences from the fermion case.
For bosons, three cases are possible, according to the single-system states that are the
factors of the separable state:
1. |θ〉 ∝ |φ0〉, i.e. |c00| = 1. Then the state is |Ψ+〉 = |φ0〉 ⊗ |φ0〉 and one can infer
that there are two bosons each with the same complete set of properties given by
E = |φ0〉〈φ0|. It may checked that for this state 〈Ψ+|E ⊗E|Ψ+〉 = 1. |Ψ〉 belongs
to no individuation block.
2. 〈θ|φ0〉 = 0, i.e. c00 = 0. Then exactly the same argument as for fermions entails
that one of the two bosons has a complete set of properties given by E := |φ0〉〈φ0|
and the other of the two bosons has a complete set of properties given by F :=
|θ〉〈θ|. The joint state |Ψ+〉 belongs the the 1-dimensional individuation block
defined by these two single-system states.
3. Finally, it can happen that 0 < |〈θ|φ0〉| < 1. In this case, it is true from the
definition above that there is a boson with a complete set of properties given by
E and it is true that there is a boson with a complete set of properties given by
F . But it is not true that one has a complete set of properties given by E and the
other has a complete set of properties given by F . For there is a non vanishing
probability of finding both particles in the same state, since 〈Ψ+|E ⊗ E|Ψ+〉 =
〈Ψ+|F ⊗ F |Ψ+〉 = |c00|2 > 0.
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According to our definition of GMW-entanglement, the joint state is non-GMW-entangled
for the first two cases. But in the last case we cannot say that the joint state is non-
GMW-entangled, even though we may say that one system has a complete set of prop-
erties given by E and one system has a complete set of properties given by F . The
worry, of course, is that we are counting contributions from the same system each time,
so we must resist the plural article ‘both’. So any state of this third type counts as
GMW-entangled, being a superposition of states of the first and second types. To sum
up:
The bosons of a two-system assembly, whose (pure) state is given by |Ψ+〉,
are non-GM-entangled iff either: (i) |Ψ+〉 is obtained by symmetrizing a
factorized product of two orthogonal states; or (ii) |Ψ+〉 is a product state of
identical factors.
To connect with our usual terminology: a fermionic joint state is GMW-entangled iff
it lies in a 1-dimensional individuation block. A bosonic state is GMW-entangled iff: (i)
it lies in a 1-dimensional individuation block (case 1, above); or (ii) it is a product state
of identical factors. For N > 2, we must add a third clause: (iii) all sub-assemblies satisfy
either (i) or (ii). If the joint state lies in an individuation block, for both bosons and
fermions the intertwiner between the individuation block and its corresponding product
Hilbert space takes GMW-entanglement in the “indistinguishable” case to entanglement
in the “distinguishable” case.
This is to be compared to the fact regarding “distinguishable” systems, that their
joint state is non-entangled iff the constituent systems (associated with factor Hilbert
spaces) occupy pure states. Both results have the same physical interpretation: that
in non-(GMW-)entangled states, the joint state of the assembly supervenes on (i.e. is
uniquely determined by) the states of its constituent systems. This is a good reason to
take GMW-entanglement as the right notion of entanglement when PI is imposed.
A further reason is given by the following result concerning Bell inequalities. From
Gisin (1991), we know that, for two “distinguishable” systems, any joint state of theirs
is entangled iff it violates a Bell inequality for some beables. But we have seen that
any 2-system individuation block is unitarily equivalent to some product Hilbert space
for 2 systems, and that the intertwiner between them takes entanglement to GMW-
entanglement. Therefore we conclude:
If the joint state lies in an individuation block, then: the joint state is GMW-
entangled iff it violates a Bell inequality for some symmetric beables.
5.3 Connections to the physics literature II: “quantum correlations”
An alternative definition of entanglement for 2-system assemblies, the existence of quan-
tum correlations, has also been suggested by Schliemann et al (2001) and Eckert et al
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(2002). They introduce the notion of the Slater rank of a joint state (Schliemann et al
(2001, 8)), in analogy with the Schmidt rank of a joint state of two “distinguishable”
systems.
For any such state, we can carry out a bi-orthogonal Schmidt decomposition:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|φi〉 ⊗ |χi〉, (88)
where 〈φi|φj〉 = 〈χi|χj〉 = 0 for i 6= j. The Schmidt rank of |Ψ〉 is the minimum integer
r, given all possible Schmidt decompositions, such that the sum (88) has r non-zero
entries. Clearly |Ψ〉 is entangled iff r > 1.
Now consider an arbitrary 2-fermion state,
|Ψ−〉 =
∑
i<j
cij
1√
2
(|φi〉 ⊗ |φj〉 − |φj〉 ⊗ |φi〉) ≡
∑
i<j
cija
†(φi)a†(φj)|0〉, (89)
where |0〉 is the Fock space vacuum, and a†(φi) is the fermion creation operator for the
state |φi〉. What we now need is a fermionic analogue to the bi-orthogonal Schmidt de-
composition. This is supplied by the following result from matrix theory (see Schliemann
et al (2001, 3 (Lemma 1)) and Mehta (1977, Theorem 4.3.15)):
For any complex anti-symmetric d×d matrix M , there is a unitary transfor-
mation U such that M˜ := UMUT has the form
M˜ = diag[Z1, . . . Zr, Z0] (90)
where
Zk :=
(
0 zk
−zk 0
)
, k ∈ {1, . . . , r} and Z0 := O(d−2r) (91)
where O(d−2r) is the (d− 2r)× (d− 2r) null matrix.
If we set M := cij , then by an unitary transformation of the single-system Hilbert space
H, we can get the joint state |Ψ−〉 in the form
|Ψ−〉 =
x 1
2
dy∑
i=1
zia
†(χ2i−1)a†(χ2i)|0〉. (92)
(where xxy is the largest integer no greater than x). Now the fermionic Slater rank of
|Ψ−〉 is the minimum number r of non-zero terms in (94). We may say that the joint
state displays quantum correlations iff r > 0.
As Eckert et al (2002, 12) remark, we do not see quantum correlations for dim(H) =:
d < 4. We can use our previous results to see give a physical insight into this claim.
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First, we must see that any state of the form (94) lies in some individuation block in H
(2)
− .
There is some conventionality here, but the following choice of individuation criteria will
do:
E1 :=
x 1
2
dy∑
i
|χ2i−1〉〈χ2i−1|; E2 :=
x 1
2
dy∑
i
|χ2i〉〈χ2i|. (93)
I.e., E1 captures all odd states |χ2i−1〉 and E2 captures all even states |χ2i〉. We may
conclude that any 2-fermion state lies in an individuation block ; I will return to this in
section 6.2.
Now the individuation block defined by E1 and E2 is unitarily equivalent to the joint
Hilbert space E1[H]⊗E2[H]. From (94) we can see that the (inverse of the) intertwiner
connecting these joint spaces sends |Ψ−〉 to
U †−|Ψ−〉 =
x 1
2
dy∑
i=1
zi|χ2i−1〉 ⊗ |χ2i〉, (94)
which has the bi-orthogonal Schmidt decomposed form of (88). Thus |Ψ−〉 exhibits
quantum correlations iff U †−|Ψ−〉 is entangled. We also know that, for fermions, the
intertwiner takes entanglement in the product space over to GMW-entanglement in
the individuation block. We conclude that any 2-fermion joint state exhibits quantum
correlations (in the sense of Eckert et al (2002)) iff it is GMW-entangled.
We can now see why, for two fermions to be exhibit quantum correlations, i.e. be
GMW-entangled, the single-system Hilbert space requires at least 4 dimensions. For
fermionic GMW-entanglement, the joint state must yield mixed states for both con-
stituent systems. This requires at least 2 states per system; the systems may not share
any states, since their individuation criteria must be orthgonal. This yields 4 single-
system states in total.
Eckert et al (2002) also offer a definition of bosonic quantum correlations. Consider
an arbitrary 2-boson state,
|Ψ+〉 =
∑
i<j
cij
1√
2(1 + δij)
(|φi〉 ⊗ |φj〉+ |φj〉 ⊗ |φi〉) ≡
∑
i<j
cijb
†(φi)b†(φj)|0〉, (95)
where |0〉 is the Fock space vacuum, and b†(φi) is the boson creation operator for the
state |φi〉. We now appeal to the following result from matrix theory (see Eckert et al
(2002, 9-10):
For any complex symmetric d×d matrix M , there is a unitary transformation
U such that M ′ := UMUT has the form
M ′ = diag[z1, . . . zr, 0, . . . , 0]. (96)
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If we set M := cij , then then by an unitary transformation of the single-system Hilbert
space H, we can get the joint state |Ψ+〉 in the form of a superposition purely of doubly-
occupied states:
|Ψ+〉 =
d∑
i=1
zi|χi〉 ⊗ |χi〉. (97)
Then the bosonic Slater rank is minimum number r of doubly-occupied states with
non-zero amplitudes. Bosonic quantum correlations correspond to r > 1.
It would be a mistake to follow Eckert et al (2002, 24) in considering a bosonic Slater
rank of more than 1 to clearly indicate anything like entanglement. The best case for
scepticism here is that the non-GMW-entangled state.
|Φ+〉 := 1√
2
(|φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉+ |χ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) (98)
may be put into the form
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|φ′〉 ⊗ |φ′〉 − |χ′〉 ⊗ |χ′〉) (99)
where
|φ′〉 := 1√
2
(|φ〉+ |χ〉); |χ′〉 := 1√
2
(|φ〉 − |χ〉); (100)
and so has a bosonic Slater rank of 2. Thus we have agreement with Ghirardi et al
only for fermions. In view of the unitary equivalence results above (section 3.3), and
the fact that intertwiners between individuation blocks and product spaces take GMW-
entanglement to entanglement, we ought to retain the GMW definition of entanglement
in the case of bosons.
5.4 A continuous measure of entanglement for 2-system assemblies
In the “distinguishable” case for assemblies of 2 systems (a.k.a. “bipartite systems”),
the entanglement of any pure joint state |Ψ〉 is commonly measured by the entropy of
entanglement E(|Ψ〉), given by the von Neumann entropy of the reduced density operator
of one of the consituent systems:
E(|Ψ〉) := S(ρ1) = −tr(ρ1 log2 ρ1), (101)
where ρ1 is obtained by a partial trace, i.e. ρ1 = Tr1(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|). This measure meets
the obvious requirement that it be independent of the choice of constituent system
(i.e. E(|Ψ〉) = S(ρ1) = S(ρ2), where ρ2 = Tr2(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)), and it has the desirable proper-
ties that: (i) it takes its minimum value 0 for separable joint states, and (ii) it takes the
maximum value log2 d when ρ1 =
1
d1, where d := dim(H) (see Nielsen & Chuang (2010,
513)).
44
Due to the possibilities afforded by qualitative individuation, we can also define
sensible reduced density operators under PI. Thus we can use the von Neumann entropy
of these reduced density operators to provide a new continuous measure of entanglement.
We can use the unitary equivalence results above to export any fact holding for
“distinguishable” systems over to “indistinguishable” systems, so long as the joint state
lies in an individuation block. In particular, we can export the fact that the von Neumann
entropy of the reduced density operator of one of the constituents is equal to that of the
other. I.e., S(ρα) = S(ρβ). (Note that it is important that systems be ubiquitous and
unique.) This fact, together with the form (67) of ρ derived in the last section, we may
infer
S(ρ) := −Tr(ρ log2 ρ) (102)
= −1
2
Tr[2ρ log2(2ρ)] + log2 2 (103)
= −1
2
[Tr(ρα log2 ρα) + Tr(ρβ log2 ρβ)] + 1 (104)
=
1
2
[S(ρα) + S(ρβ)] + 1 (105)
= S(ρα) + 1. (106)
Therefore the von Neumann entropy of any qualitatively individuated system differs
from that of a factorist system only by a constant characterised by the total number of
systems, 2.
For fermion states, S(ρ) cannot be less that log2 2. Under a factorist interpreta-
tion, this minimum indicates “inaccessible” entanglement brought about by the (anti-)
symmetrization dictated by PI. However, under an anti-factorist interpretation, this
minimum is a result of Pauli exclusion, combined with the fact that ρ is not the state
of any genuine system, but rather a statistical artefact, an “average state”. Given Pauli
exclusion, this average state cannot be definite, and is less definite the more fermions
there are; thus the entropy of the state cannot fall under log2 2. On the other hand, the
von Neumann entropies S(ρα) and S(ρβ) of the genuine systems has a minimum value
of zero, corresponding to a non-GMW-entangled joint state for the assembly.
The maximum value of S(ρ) is log2 d, where d is the dimension of the single-system
Hilbert space, corresponding to ρ = 1d1. It follows that, whenever the joint state lies
in an individuation block, the qualitatively individuated systems cannot have a von
Neumann entropy exceeding log2(
d
2). In fact, the results of section 5.3 entail that for
fermions this upper limit can be refined to log2(xd2y). Finally, it may also be shown that
the entropy of entanglement for a joint state of 2 fermions never exceeds log2 r, where r
is its fermionic Slater rank.
All this suggests that a good measure of GMW-entanglement is given by EGMW (|Ψ〉) :=
S(ρ) − log2 2 ≡ E(|Ψ〉) − log2 2. As we have seen, this measure carries over to “indis-
tinguishable” systems all of the desirable properties of the entropy of entanglement for
“distinguishable” systems. Its only drawback is that applies only when the joint state
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lies in an individuation block. However, as we shall see in the next section, this is a
restriction only for bosonic states. How to measure entanglement for bosonic states
which do not lie in an individuation block—i.e. those that contain terms with identical
factors—is still an open question.
6 Implications for discernibility
6.1 When are “indistinguishable” quantum systems discernible?
As we saw in section 3.3, any individuation block of either the fermion or boson N -system
joint Hilbert space “behaves” in every way (restricted to that block), due to unitary
equivalence, like a corresponding joint Hilbert space for “distinguishable” systems, in
which PI is not imposed. According to our interpretative principle regarding unitarily
equivalent reps (2.4), we ought therefore to give the same physical interpretation to both
joint Hilbert spaces. Since in the “distinguishable” case, we are happy to say that our
systems are discerned, since they always possess different properties (their corresponding
single-system Hilbert spaces share no state in common), we ought to be happy to say
the same in the case of our so-called “indistinguishable” systems. Therefore, if the
assembly’s state lies completely in an individuation block, the constituent systems are
discernible.
What kind of discernibility do we have here? A modest tradition of taxonomizing
grades of discernibility was inaugurated by Quine (1960), and has been continued by
Saunders (2003b, 2006), Ketland (2011), Caulton & Butterfield (2012a), Ladyman, Pet-
tigrew and Linnebo (2012); and was crucial to identifying the subtle kind of discernbility
in the results of Muller and Saunders (2008), Muller and Seevinck (2009), Caulton (2013)
and Huggett and Norton (2013). There is a general consensus that there are three main
grades, here defined in model-theoretic terms. We fix some language L. Then:
• Absolute discernibility. Two objects a and b are absolutely discernible in some
model M iff there is some monadic formula φ(x), expressible in L and not contain-
ing any singular terms, such that M  φ(a) and M  ¬φ(b).
• Relative discernibility. Two objects a and b are relatively discernible in some model
M iff there is some dyadic formula ψ(x, y), expressible in L and not containing any
singular terms, such that M  ψ(a, b) and M  ¬ψ(b, a).
• Weak discernibility. Two objects a and b are weakly discernible in some model M
iff there is some dyadic formula ψ(x, y), expressible in L and not containing any
singular terms, such that M  ψ(a, b) and M  ¬ψ(a, a).
I say that there are three grades, since it may be shown that absolute entails relative
discernibility, and relative entails weak (Quine (1960, 230)). Therefore absolute discerni-
bility is the strongest kind. And it is the kind exhibited by qualitatively individuated
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systems, since these systems (like their “distinguishable” counterparts) enjoy the phys-
ical interpretation of having orthogonal single-particle states, and the occupation of a
single-particle state is expressible with a monadic predicate.
In summary: if the assembly’s joint state lies in an individuation block, then its
constituent systems are absolutely discernible. So our question now is, In what cases
does the assembly’s joint state lie in some individuation block?
6.2 Absolutely discerning fermions, and “quantum counterpart the-
ory”
Here we use the results of sections 5.2 and 5.3. In the discussion of fermions in section
5.3 we saw that any 2-fermion joint state can be ‘Slater decomposed’, and that individ-
uation criteria may be chosen such that the joint state has support entirely within the
individuation block so defined. It follows that fermions are absolutely discernible in all
states.
It is worth emphasising that this result does not depend on the fermions in question
possessing pure states; in fact the general form (89) of the 2-fermion joint state entails
that the reduced density operators for the constituent fermions will typically be mixed.
So I am not here appealing to the undeniable fact that fermionic Fock space quanta—
which are always in pure states—are always absolutely discernible. In fact, this latter
result follows as special case of our general result for fermions, in which the individuation
criteria are all 1-dimensional.
Recall too that there is conventionality in the choice of individuation criteria which
determine an individuation block that will capture the joint state. Given the generic
‘Slater decomposed’ form for the joint state,
|Ψ−〉 =
x 1
2
dy∑
i=1
zi
1√
2
(|χ2i−1〉 ⊗ |χ2i〉 − |χ2i〉 ⊗ |χ2i−1〉) (107)
≡
x 1
2
dy∑
i=1
zi|χ2i−1〉 ∧ |χ2i〉, (108)
(where we use for convenience the short-hand notation
|φ〉 ∧ |χ〉 := 1√
2
(|φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉 − |χ〉 ⊗ |φ〉), (109)
which, in analogy with differential geometry, we might call the wedge product of |φ〉 and
|χ〉; I will say more about the wedge product in Section ??), there are 2(x 12dy−1) different
choices for the pair of individuation criteria, all of which yield a suitable individuation
block, as illustrated in Figure 4.
The physical interpretation of this is that there is no unique objective “trans-state
identity” relation for qualitatively individuated systems. As I remarked in section 3.1,
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|Ψ−〉 = z1|χ1〉 ∧ |χ2〉 + z2|χ3〉 ∧ |χ4〉 + . . . + zx 1
2
dy|χ2x 1
2
dy−1〉 ∧ |χ2x 1
2
dy〉
. . .
E1
. . .
E2
|Ψ−〉 = z1|χ1〉 ∧ |χ2〉 + z2|χ3〉 ∧ |χ4〉 + . . . + zx 1
2
dy|χ2x 1
2
dy−1〉 ∧ |χ2x 1
2
dy〉
. . .
E1
. . .
E2
...
Choices on
each branch:
1 × 2 × . . . × 2 = 2(x 12dy−1)
Figure 4: Choices of individuation criteria for an arbitrary 2-fermion joint state.
this suggests a quantum analogue of Lewis’s (1968) Counterpart Theory. In that theory,
intended to provide an alternative to orthodox modal logic, there is no unique, objec-
tive “trans-world identity” relation between individuals in different possible worlds; the
result being that many modal claims depend for their truth on a (usually contextually
determined—or under-determined!) choice of “counterpart relations” between individu-
als from different possible worlds.
Here, the lack of any unique, objective “trans-state identity” relation affects not only
modal claims but also non-modal claims. This is due to the possibility in quantum me-
chanics of superposing states to yield new states; so in particular, certain facts regarding
a given GMW-entangled state hang on a choice of “counterpart relations” between the
constituent systems in each of the non-GMW-entangled “branches” of which it is a su-
perposition. These counterpart relations are determined by a choice of individuation
criteria, and the dependence of certain facts on this choice is reflected in the dependence
on the choice of individuation criteria of the effective joint state, as presceribed by (17).14
The situation for bosons is partly given by the above results for fermions, together
with the unitary equivalence results we have made so much use of. Specifically: for
any GMW-entangled bosonic joint state lying in an individuation block, we can expect
there to be an alternative choice of individuation criteria, and therefore an alternative
individuation block, which captures the state. Quantum counterpart theory goes for
bosons as much as for fermions.
14Strictly speaking, an individuation criterion determines a counterpart relation that is more con-
strained than those permitted by Lewis. Lewis’s counterpart relations are deliberately designed so that
they need not be equivalence relations; whereas the relation ‘satisfies the same individuation criterion E
as’ is manifestly an equivalence relation.
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In fact in the bosonic case it may be argued that the situation is closer to Lewis’s
scheme: take for example the (GMW-entangled) state
|Ψ〉 = α|φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉+ β 1√
2
(|φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉+ |χ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) (110)
No individuation block captures this state, but it is sensible to extend our ideas of qual-
itative individuation and say that the two systems in |φ〉 in the first “branch” (with
amplitude α) are both counterparts to the system in |φ〉 in the second “branch” (with
amplitude β). Here the counterpart relation between branches determined by the in-
dividuation criterion |φ〉〈φ| fails to pick out a unique system in every branch, just as
Lewis’s counterpart relation is permitted to fail to pick out a unique individual in every
world.
6.3 Discerning bosons: whither weak discernibility?
As usual, anything said of fermionic joint states also applies to bosonic joint states
that lie in some individuation block. Therefore, both the absolute discernibility and
the conventionality of “trans-state identity” carries over for bosons—so long as the joint
state lies in an individuation block.
However, In section 5.2, we saw that there are bosonic states that lie in no individu-
ation block: these states have non-zero amplitudes for multiply-occupied single-system
states that cannot be removed under any change of basis in the single-system Hilbert
space (in Figure 1, this corresponds to non-zero amplitudes for square lying along the
diagonal). Our requirement that individuation criteria for distinct systems be orthogo-
nal (one which the unitary equivalence result depends) means that these states can be
captured by no individuation block.
Moreover, in the jargon of Ghirardi & Marinatto (2003), we may say of doubly-
occupied bosonic states that both bosons have a complete set of properties, as determined
by some 1-dimensional projector. Our unitary equivalence results do not apply here
(since the joint state lies outside any individuation block), so there are no clues from
there about how to interpret these states. But, given that the number operator for some
single-system state |φ〉 has eigenvalue 2 in such a joint state, it is natural to interpret
this joint state as constituted by two systems, both in the state (represented by) |φ〉.
Since the two bosons share the same state, we must conclude that they are not
absolutely discernible. It appears too that they must not be relatively discernible. Might
they yet be weakly discernible? The claim that bosons are weakly discernible has been
defended recently (by Muller & Seevinck (2009), Caulton (2013), Huggett & Norton
(2013)). However, these claims depend for their physical significance on the assumption
that factor Hilbert space labels represent or denote constituent systems, i.e. they assume
factorism.
Take for example Theorem 2 of Caulton (2013):
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For each state ρ of an assembly of two particles, the relation R′(Q, x, y)
[defined by
R′(A, x, y) iff
1
4
Tr
[
ρ
(
A(x) −A(y)
)2] 6= 0 (111)
where A(1) := A ⊗ 1 and A(2) := 1 ⊗ A] discerns particles 1 and 2 weakly
. . . where Q is the single-particle position operator, on the assumption of the
Born rule.
The idea behind this theorem is that, even for product states with identical factors, if the
assembly comprises more than 1 constituent, then this is indicated by anti-correlations in
some single-system beable of which the constituent systems’ states are not eigenstates.
These anti-correlations are taken to be measured by the (symmetric) beable ∆2A :=
1
4
(
A(1) −A(2))2. (We then take advantage of the fact that no eigenstates of Q exist in
the single-system Hilbert space.)
However, despite that fact that 14
(
A(x) −A(y))2, and therefore the relationR′(A, x, y),
is permutation-invariant for any A, x, y, the condition on the RHS of (111) may be in-
terpreted as a relation between two particles only if x and y take particle names as
substitution instances. In fact, they take factor Hilbert space labels as substitution in-
stances (as indicated by the definitions of A(x)), so it is only if factorism is right—which
it is not—that the condition counts as a genuine relation between physical systems. Thus
the weak discernibility claim fails.
However, the theorem undoubtedly has some physical interpretation. Can’t we still
say of our two bosons in the joint state |φ〉⊗|φ〉 that their states exhibit anti-correlations
in some basis? Here we run into difficulty. Under anti-factorism, the only way to refer to
constituent systems is via individuation criteria—in this case we say that there are two
bosons in the state |φ〉. Therefore the identity of the systems is inextricably tied to our
choice of individuation criteria: if we change the criteria, then we change the subject.
Therefore, to be able to talk about the sort of anti-correlations of which Caulton’s (2013)
Theorem 2 takes advantage, we would have to shift our individuation criteria to that
basis, but by doing so we would thereby be talking about a different collection of bosons.
Our original question, whether the two bosons in state |φ〉 are weakly discernible, remains
unanswered.
6.4 Comparisons with classical particle mechanics
At this point it may be illuminating to mark the similarities and differences between
classical point-like particles and fermions and bosons. Just as, in quantum mechanics,
under PI we are led to consider the joint space of symmetric (H
(N)
+ ) or anti-symmetric
(H
(N)
− ) states, in classical mechanics, under PI, we are led to consider the reduced phase
space (RPS) Γred, which is the standard phase space Γ—a Cartesian product of N copies
of the single particle phase space, Γ =
∏N γ—quotiented by the symmetric group SN
(see Belot 2001, 66-70).
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The classical version of PI states that for all quantities f with a physical interpreta-
tion, and all pi ∈ SN ,
(f ◦ P (pi))(ξ) = f(ξ) (112)
for all joint states ξ ∈ Γ, where the symplectomorphism-valued function P is defined by
P (pi)(〈q1, p1, . . . , qn, pn〉) := 〈qpi−1(1), ppi−1(1), . . . , qpi−1(n), ppi−1(n)〉. (113)
Classical PI entails that all states in the same SN -orbit give the same values for all
physical quantities f , and it is this that justifies quotienting Γ by SN .
Individuation blocks in the quantum case correspond to “off-diagonal” rectangular
regions of the RPS; these regions have a Cartesian product structure, rather than the
individuation blocks’ tensor product structure, and they behave just like phase spaces
for “distinguishable” particles (i.e. when PI is not imposed).
More specifically, let Ei, i = 1, . . . , N be N disjoint regions of the single-particle
phase space, i.e. Ei ⊆ γ, and Ei∩Ej = ∅ for all i 6= j. Then the joint phase space ΓD :=∏N
i Ei represents physical states in which all N distinguishable particles necessarily have
different positions or momenta. We may now define a symplectomorphism h : ΓD → R
from this joint phase space onto a region R ⊂ Γred:
h(ξ) := {(P (pi))(ξ) | pi ∈ SN}. (114)
h maps points of ΓD to their orbits under SN ; these orbits are the “points” of R. h
induces a “drag-along” map h∗ on quantities on ΓD; any quantity for “distinguishable”
particles f : ΓD → R is sent to a permutation-invariant quantity h∗f for “indistinguish-
able” particles, according to the rule (h∗f)(ξ) := (f ◦ h−1)(ξ), for all ξ ∈ R.
This symplectomorphism warrants us to afford the same physical interpretation to
the states of R that we afford to the states of ΓD; in particular, that the constituent
particles are absolutely discernible, since they all possess different positions or momenta.
So long as the system point lies in R, we can adjudicate matters of trans-state (and
therefore also trans-temporal) identity, talk about the same particles having different
positions and momenta in different states, etc. But we are mindful that the existence of
different product phase spaces Γ′D ⊂ Γ with different symplectomorphisms h′ such that
h′ : Γ′D → R forces us to recognise a conventionality in these adjudications. (See Figure
5).
No single individuation region (the term we may coin for regions such as R) can cap-
ture the entire RPS Γred, since Γred does not have a global Cartesian product structure.
However, some individuation region may be found for almost all joint states: the only
states that cause trouble are those in which two particles have exactly the same position
and momentum. (These states already cause trouble, since they lie on a boundary in
the RPS, and therefore one cannot define tangent vectors for them.)
This far, the qualitative individuation of classical particles under PI is entirely analo-
gous to that of their quantum counterparts. This is perhaps a surprise: for the quantum
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Figure 5: The symplectomorphism h between the joint phase space spaces ΓD and R.
The square on the left represents the full phase space Γ and the triangle on the right
represents the full reduced phase space Γred. Cf. Figure 1.
joint state, unlike the classical joint state, is not confined to a single point of the state
space, but may rather be conceived as a wave that may spread throughout all of con-
figuration space; yet, in the case of fermions and for most bosonic states, the state may
still be confined to some individuation block.
These analogies should also bring reassurance to those wishing to conceptually rec-
oncile rival approaches to imposing PI in quantum mechanics. This article has focussed
exclusively on the procedure in which we first quantize and then impose PI; but one
may instead proceed by first imposing PI on the classical joint phase space, and then
quantizing. The result is that (for 3 spatial dimensions or more) one automatically
yields states belonging to either the boson or fermion sectors of H(N) (see Leinaas &
Myrheim (1977), Morandi (1992, ch. 3)). We are therefore justified in thinking of the
qualitative individuation present in this section 3 as the quantized version of qualitative
individuation for classical particles on the RPS, as just outlined.
However, there are significant differences between the classical and quantum cases.
I will discuss two here; they may both be considered a consequence of the possibility of
quantum superpositions and incompatible beables:
1. Disjunctive individuation. I remarked at the end of section 3.3 above that one can-
not qualitatively individuate by using multiple individuation blocks at once, since
this induces a superselection rule between individuation blocks and one therefore
loses important information about the joint state. The same is not true in the
classical case: that is, one may mosaic the entire RPS—excluding the “diagonal”
points—with individuation regions, and thereby capture every joint state that does
not lie along the “diagonal”. (I call this “disjunctive individuation”, since it has
the logical form of a disjunction of conjuncts: e.g. ‘either particle 1’s state lies in
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E
(1)
1 while particle 2’s state lies in E
(1)
2 . . . , or particle 1’s state lies in E
(2)
1 while
particle 2’s state lies in E
(2)
2 . . . , or . . . ’.)
This also means that one may make the individuation regions as small as one likes
without losing information. This, in effect, is what is going on when we opt for a
relational means of discerning the two classical particles. For example, for any 2-
particle state in which the 1-particle configuration space is R, the choice to label as
particle “1” the particle that lies leftmost along the line (i.e. q1 < q2) is equivalent
to foliating the joint phase space with infinitely many individuation regions R(q)
(one for each value of q) in which the corresponding ΓD(q) := E1(q) × E2(q) =
{〈q1, p1; q2, p2〉 | q1 6 q & q2 > q}.
2. Incommensurable individuation criteria and composition. Another significantly
novel aspect of qualitative individuation in quantum mechanics is that the same
state may be captured by two different individuation blocks determined by mu-
tually incompatible pairs of individuation criteria. For example, the non-GMW
entangled fermion state
1√
2
(|φ〉 ⊗ |χ〉 − |χ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) (115)
may be captured by the 1-dimensional individuation block defined by the criteria
E(1)α := |φ〉〈φ|; E(1)β := |χ〉〈χ| (116)
but this block is defined also by the incompatible criteria
E(2)α := |φ′〉〈φ′|; E(2)β := |χ′〉〈χ′| (117)
where
|φ′〉 := α|φ〉+ β|χ〉; |χ′〉 := −β∗|φ〉+ α∗|χ〉 (118)
and α, β 6= 0 or 1.
This phenomenon, which arises only for fermions but not bosons, has serious conse-
quences for the sense in which an assembly is composed of its constituent systems.
This matter is pursued in AUTHOR (2014).
7 Conclusion: why worry?
I have argued that we can take experimentally observed conformity with permutation-
invariance in quantum mechanics as evidence for the conclusion that what is permuted
in the formalism—the order of the factor Hilbert spaces, or the factor Hilbert space
“labels”—has no physical significance, just as in electromagnetism we take the gauge-
invariance of all observed quantities as evidence against the physical significance of the
four-vector potential. The consequence of doing so is that some reform is necessary in
the usual way of doing quantum mechanics.
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In particular, we need to reform our ideas of: (i) how to extract the state of any
constituent system of an assembly; and (ii) what formal properties of the joint state
indicate entanglement in a physically meaningful sense. Accordingly, I have proposed:
(i) a means of extracting states of constituent systems conducive to the demands of
permutation-invariance, using a method I call ‘qualitative individuation’; and (ii) an
alternative definition of entanglement, GMW-entanglement, for which non-separability
is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Both of these proposals rely on the fact that
certain regions, called ‘individuation blocks’, of the joint bosonic or fermionic Hilbert
spaces are unitarily equivalent to joint Hilbert spaces associated with “distinguishable”
systems, in which permutation-invariance is not imposed.
The physical upshot of these proposals for the discernibility of “indistinguishable”
systems are: (i) that fermions are always absolutely discernible; and (ii) that bosons are
usually absolutely discernible, but sometimes utterly indiscernible. A more unwelcome
result is that joint states of fermions which, physically speaking, ought not to count as
entangled, are aptly represented by subspaces of the joint Hilbert space. The physical
interpretation of this result is that fermions cannot be said to compose their assemblies,
at least in any normal sense of the word ‘compose’.
There is a tempting, simple response to the puzzles discussed above. Since they arise
from an attempt to understand quantum mechanics as a theory about objects that can
be composed into assemblies, why not use the puzzles as a premise in an argument for
the misguidedness of that understanding?
It can’t be denied that this response engenders a certain relief at having cut the
Gordian knot. But on second thoughts, doubt and confusion creep back. For an un-
derstanding of the single-system Hilbert space and its associated algebra of operators
is normally our gateway to understanding the joint Hilbert space and its associated al-
gebra. (It is what allows us, for example, to interpret the operator (σ ⊗ 1 + 1 ⊗ σ) as
the total spin operator.) It hard to see that we can take these heuristics seriously once
we have given up on the homely idea that an assembly is composed out of constituent
systems.
However, there is an alternative physical picture, which gives prominence to the
points or regions of space-time, and understands particles and their hitherto-composites
as patterns in the properties assigned to these regions (see e.g. Wallace & Timpson 2010).
This picture is more familiar from quantum field theory. It is noteworthy that we are
led to it from considerations confined entirely to elementary quantum mechanics.
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